San
gatte,
1999 – 2002

Sangatte is a remote, and by most accounts unremarkable village near the busy port of Calais in northern France. But from 1999 until 2002, and arguably until this day, ‘Sangatte’ functioned as a signifier for a set of complexities and tensions related to issues of asylum, borders, migrants and citizenship in contemporary Europe. In 1999 the French government requisitioned a vast hanger of 25,000 square metres. The hanger had previously been used to store drilling equipment used by the Eurotunnel company to build a tunnel under the sea linking France and the UK. Placed under the humanitarian auspices of the Red Cross, the hanger was turned into a makeshift refugee reception centre, or as many observers were to call it, a ‘refugee camp’. The aim was to accommodate the increasing numbers of migrants who were drawn to nearby Calais in attempting to cross the Channel to England. Until it was closed by the French government on 5 November 2002, as many as 76,000 people passed through Sangatte. In some ways the changing population of the centre offered a microcosm of shifting humanitarian crises in the wider world. Initially the centre was mostly populated by people fleeing conflicts in the Balkans. That population gave way to refugees escaping Afghanistan. By the time the centre was closed the largest group was predominantly young male Iraqi Kurds (Coureau 2003).

A host of political issues and interests converged on the space of Sangatte. For transportation companies Sangatte was primarily a problem of business. The railway company Eurostar took legal action against the French Government in a bid to close the centre because of the financial burden which security against unauthorized migrants was placing upon its commercial operations. It also initiated legal action in the English courts where it challenged the UK Government’s proposal to fine companies for every ‘illegal immigrant’ arriving on their trains (The Daily Telegraph 2001). Journalists and TV cameras also converged in great numbers at Sangatte.
Perhaps more than anything Sangatte was closely associated in British news reporting with the migrants’ repeated attempts to board moving trains and ‘break in’ to the tunnel and the UK itself. On at least one occasion TV coverage showed migrants apparently ‘storming’ the tunnel entrance in a bid to ‘walk under the waves to Britain’ (The Observer 2001). For significant sections of British public opinion the events at Sangatte stood for a French government bent on offloading its unwanted population upon the United Kingdom, while for others it testified to the ‘over-generous’ terms of the UK’s asylum provisions, terms which made that country an ‘Eldorado’ for asylum-seekers. In the French press Sangatte came to symbolize among other things ‘the plight of the refugees, their hellish journeys to the west, their nightmare dealings with the... people smugglers’ (The Guardian 2001). Never missing an opportunity to play upon Anglo/French comparisons and rivalries, many commentators in both countries found in the controversy at Sangatte one more occasion to manufacture national identity.

But Sangatte also became a temporary social observatory concerning new forms of migration, not the least being the role played by les passeurs, the ‘people smugglers’ (Coureau 2003). As a result of a series of intrepid, undercover sorties by journalists, a more nuanced and contradictory tale of the centre emerged. The public learnt almost at first hand of the dire conditions at Sangatte; the tactics and the resolve with which the migrants sought to ‘breach’ the fortified entrance to the tunnel; and the extent to which the smugglers had come to structure life in the centre and its environs. Sangatte also offered sociologists and ethnographers a laboratory where for three years it was possible to observe at relatively close quarters the new kinds of migration that were so troubling European publics. Consequently a sociological and ethnographic knowledge of Sangatte has also emerged (Coureau 2003; Laacher 2002; Schwenken 2003).

I have started with Sangatte because it is an event that condenses two themes that will be central to the first part of this chapter: homo sacer and autonomous migration. These are both themes which have become highly topical, and in some ways controversial, within recent social theories of migration and citizenship. The first theme comes to us from Giorgio Agamben’s theorization of the ‘ban’ and its production of ‘naked life’ (Agamben 1998; Agamben 2000). It has been widely adopted within critical migration and refugee studies, sociology, and international relations theory to map the ways in which contemporary programmes of immigration control, and the regimes of citizenship which underpin them, ensnare ‘irregular migrants’ in an indeterminate space (‘the camp’) that is neither fully inside nor outside the social and legal order (Diken 2004; Diken and Lautsen 2002; Edkins 2000; Perera 2002; Prem Kumar and Grundy-Warr 2004).

The second theme is in some respects the polar opposite of homo sacer. If the latter designates a space and an identity where the migrant appears suspended between an inside and an outside, positioned as a vulnerable, ‘bare’ existence, the theme of autonomous migration offers a quite different and in certain respects more optimistic view of unauthorized forms of migration – one that signals their transformative potential (Hardt and Negri 2000; Mezzadra 2004; Mezzadra and Neilson 2003; Rodriguez 1996). In the figure and the elusive movement of the unauthorized migrant, many theorists of autonomous migration have detected a deterritorializing force that is unravelling statist regimes of citizenship and, in some cases, prefiguring new spaces of affinity and community. For researchers in this second vein, migration is a potentially creative social movement capable of confounding and destabilizing the distributions and markings of sovereign power.
Scholarly interest in both themes has advanced rapidly in recent years. Yet it is a somewhat curious fact that, at least as far as studies of migration and citizenship are concerned, there has to date been relatively little dialogue between these positions (but see Mezzadra and Neilson 2003). Perhaps this is because they are quite different in their tone and the political conclusions towards which they tend. Whatever the reasons, the first aim of this chapter is to call for a greater interchange between these two trajectories. I am particularly interested in a set of questions that theories of autonomous migration might raise for homo sacer. To what extent is the frequently bleak and occasionally apocalyptic vision which Agamben and his followers offer us challenged by the perspective of autonomous migration? How is the argument that the unauthorized migrant has become homo sacer modified once we recognize more fully the strategic and agonistic character of contemporary border crossings; that mobility is, in other words, a site of struggle in its own right. Is ‘the camp’ an adequate ‘diagram’ (Deleuze 1988: 34-44) for expressing these struggles, or does it actually obscure new acts and spaces of citizenship?

In the final two sections of the chapter I turn to recent work developing the theme of acts of citizenship. Calling as it does for an analytical focus on the various ways in which citizenship is enacted, performed, and contingently assembled, I argue that acts of citizenship moves us beyond Agamben’s preoccupation with mechanisms of capture. For it helps us better understand the occasions when those captured outside a given sociopolitical order have managed to invent or appropriate forms of political subjectivity for themselves, and sometimes interrupt that order. Further research in this vein will surely serve as a critical provocation to the gloomy image of the camp. But it should also function as a caution to those who, like Hardt and Negri (2000), would found a theory of global citizenship on the evidence of autonomous migration.

While recognizing the merits of an analytical focus on the act, I caution against a generalized application of the notion of acts of citizenship. The key argument towards which the chapter builds is that political analysis should not overlook those moments when political interventions refuse to make strong claims in the name of citizenship. I shall argue that by ignoring the case of those acts which intentionally or unintentionally, strategically or habitually leave relatively open the question of the identity of the protagonists whom they engage, we blind ourselves to the political possibilities which inhere in certain moments of struggle. I develop this point by returning to the scene of Sangatte. More specifically I examine a recent project by the collective An Architektur. This group has produced a series of maps of the migration and security processes that occurred at Sangatte. Reading this political intervention as an act of demonstration rather than an act of citizenship, I argue that An Architektur abstains from making strong claims about the political identity of the migrants at Sangatte. Instead, its activities serve to demonstrate Sangatte as a sort of new frontier, one for which our current forms of knowledge are patently inadequate. All mapping is necessarily selective and partial. But in this case mapping can be interpreted as an act which appeals to a public forum that is yet to come, and invokes the possibility of a public discourse in which the identities of its subjects are not predetermined.

**Unauthorized Migration and Homo Sacer**

Few theorists have won the attention of critical scholars in recent years quite like Giorgio Agamben. In a series of controversial and highly original studies he has set out a unique perspective on the relationship between sovereign power, biopolitics, law and subjectivity under
modern conditions (Agamben 1998; Agamben 2000). Agamben presents a narrative in which contemporary politics tends ever more to become subsumed within biopolitics, and the figure of the citizen approximates a naked, exposed form of life, stripped of rights and vulnerable to the decisionistic operations of sovereign authorities. At the centre of this narrative is the figure of *homo sacer*, which Agamben adapts from Roman history. This was the being who was banned—placed outside both sacred and political domains

in such a way that if killed, their death was incapable of counting either as murder or sacrifice. *Homo sacer* is thus a form of ‘naked life’ which, according to Agamben, was once the ‘hidden foundation of sovereignty’ but today has become ‘the dominant form of life everywhere’ (2000: 6). Naked life materializes in all manner of circumstances: it is a consequence of the tendency towards the biotechnical management and enhancement of human life, just as it can arise in situations where populations find themselves deported, expelled and stateless, stripped of the rights of citizenship and dependent upon regimes of humanitarian assistance for their existence. It was in the dreadful figure of Auschwitz that naked life achieved perhaps its most vivid expression. But today, Agamben insists, ‘we are all virtually *homines sacri*’ (1998: 115).

Agamben’s work has proved particularly influential in critical migration studies, especially amongst those seeking to make sense of new configurations of citizenship and non-citizenship. Particularly important has been Agamben’s reflection on the space that he calls ‘the camp’. It is this concept that has offered critical theorists something of a paradigm with which to think about the complex and ambiguous location – at once social, legal and spatial - which refugees and other forms of unwanted and/or unauthorized migrants occupy today. The camp indicates a space that is formally outside the juridical and political order, but a space that, because it captures its subjects outside, is never a condition of pure externality (2000: 40):

*The camp is the space that opens up when the state of exception starts to become the rule. In it, the state of exception, which was essentially a temporal suspension of the state of law, acquires a permanent spatial arrangement that, as such, remains constantly outside the normal state of law*’ (2000: 39; emphasis in original).

It is not difficult to understand why Agamben has been taken up so positively in migration and citizenship studies. His work speaks powerfully to current political circumstances, not the least being the alarming elevation of ‘terrorism’ to the point where it now operates as a ‘meta-issue’ within global politics, capable of re-legitimating torture and other serious violations of human rights. Many would no doubt see the indefinite detention of ‘enemy combatants’ within the extraterritorial space of Guantanamo as further confirmation of Agamben’s hypothesis that the camp is capable of materializing in the most unexpected ways and places. However, Agamben also offers something important to studies of migration and citizenship. For some time, critical scholars have decried what they saw as the persistent ‘exclusion’ from institutions and rights of citizenship of certain classes of migrant in western countries. As perhaps the pre-eminent theorist of the interstitial, Agamben offers an important qualifier here. He draws our attention to the ambiguous, grey zone between the
inside and the outside, the social condition of being neither fully excluded nor fully recognized (2000: 40). This conceptualization of an in-between space, a ‘zone of indistinction’, is perhaps one of his most significant accomplishments.

While there can be no doubting the importance of Agamben’s work for the analysis of contemporary migration politics, his thinking also raises problems. Yet too often scholars in the English-speaking world have seized upon Agamben’s work in an enthusiastic but insufficiently critical manner. This lack of caution is rather strange given the sometimes hubristic and vaguely apocalyptic nature of his enterprise. In view of the controversial nature of Agamben’s claims, I want to suggest that a more cautious engagement with his work is in order. To this end, I want to make two points.

The first point is somewhat tangential to the purposes of this paper, but worth noting briefly. It concerns the generalization of the idea of the camp. Agamben argues that today the camp materializes in all sorts of situations, whenever there is a ‘materialization of the state of exception’ and a ‘consequent creation of a space for naked life’ (2000: 41). He insists that the camp can be detected in all manner of sites, ranging from the gated communities of affluence to the banlieues, the ‘no-go’ areas, and the ‘inner city’ where the poor and workless are gathered. Given the fact that Agamben derives the concept of the camp from Auschwitz, there is clearly a risk that this move ‘seriously banalize[s] the Nazi genocide’ (Mezzadra and Neilson 2003: para.17). With this point in mind, Mezzadra is surely correct to emphasize a distinction between what he calls lager and concentration camps. The lager finds its origins in projects of colonialism in such places as South Africa and Cuba. As ‘an administrative space in which men and women who have not committed any crime are denied their right to mobility’, he suggests that the lager is a more appropriate concept than the extermination camp for thinking about the contemporary practice of detaining refugees and migrants.

But I think that this kind of distinction can in fact be taken further. Rather than identifying ever more expressions of the camp, do we not get a better sense of the variability of relations of citizenship and non-citizenship by considering a plurality of what Isin and Rygiel (2007: 185) call ‘abject spaces’, embodying ‘different strategies’ of abjection but also provoking different acts of resistance. Hence, Isin and Rygiel suggest that zones (e.g., of ‘free’ enterprise and export-processing) and frontiers exemplify abject spaces that are not reducible to the camp. We could certainly add to such a list the diagrams of the township, the ghetto and the plantation. The point is not that such a list is exhaustive but that it helps us avoid the kind of mistake that was made by those readers of Foucault who managed to find the sinister presence of the panopticon lurking in all manner of institutional and political settings. If the camp is not to become the new ‘panopticon’, then it is necessary to attend to the variability of abject space.

My second point of criticism is more central to the overall theme of this chapter. It concerns the fact that Agamben’s perspective seems to offer little space for registering the political and social agency of its subjects. In Agamben’s account, and even more so in much of the research that has explored his themes in the context of migration studies, refugees and migrants are depicted as cast into spaces at the limit of the law, contained outside the system of legal protection, trapped in zones of indistinction. As one recent study has put it: ‘refugees in detention in Australia, Thailand, and Malaysia [can be understood as] hominis sacri, bare lives consigned to zones of exemption where the sovereign law ceases to function’ (Prem Kumar and...
Grundy-Warr 2004: 38). In these kinds of accounts, they are subjects to whom all manner of things are done, often in arbitrary and violent ways, but rarely agents in their own right.

As a consequence of this depiction we might note that despite all the insights this perspective offers concerning the complex mechanisms of sovereign power, it carries with it a certain irony, namely to reproduce the view of migrants as passive, almost helpless beings. For all its critical thrust, Agamben’s line of thinking seems to lead us away from a dynamic, agonistic account of power relations, and instead fosters a rather one-sided and flattened conception of migrant subjects. Things are always done to them not by them. Only occasionally are they granted the capacity to act, and then in desperate ways. For the most part it is a narrative in which authority is just that and sovereign power has the last laugh. It is with this criticism in mind that I turn now to a line of research that certainly has placed migrant struggles at its centre.

The Autonomy of Migration

In contrast to the sombre tone of Agamben’s reflections, the debate concerning the autonomy of migration has fostered a somewhat more optimistic view of the trajectory of migration politics, and the possibilities of a transformative citizenship more generally. It is important to note that the autonomy of migration is not a singular political theory anymore than it is a coherent political movement. It would perhaps be better to regard it as an emergent ethos operating within thought spaces that bridge across academic and activist milieus. It is especially evident in debates in Italy, France, Australia, and the United States (in the latter case in relation to Latina/o migration) where it has found resonance in the concrete political struggles of migrants.

Research in this vein often starts with a particular observation. It is the apparent failure of even the most restrictive and concerted state strategies of migration control and border policing to achieve their stated aim, namely the determination of who should enter the country, who should form bonds of community, and on what terms. ‘Autonomy of migration is not supposed to mean sovereignty of migrants, but rather that migrants are not simply objects of state control – that migrants defy controls and resist racist discrimination’ (Kanak Attak n.d.).

As an ongoing, mass phenomenon, undocumented migration is taken to testify to the presence of a certain autonomy which inheres in the act of migration, an autonomy which, in turn, defies the sovereign power of the state. As a politics, the autonomy of migration finds its support in a number of positions including contemporary anarchisms, radical and anti-racist cosmopolitanisms, and post-soviet communisms. Its most immediate tactical demands include the more or less unconditional regularization of undocumented migrants and the extension of their rights. However, its more principled and overarching objective is the struggle for a generalized right of free movement, but also a right to stay. As Schwenken (2003) notes, the latter is sometimes accorded more emphasis since it is assumed that migrants take the right of free movement anyway.

One of the most widely read and influential articulations of the autonomy of migration is to be found in Hardt and Negri’s (2000) bestselling Empire. Expressed as acts of exodus, desertion and flight, what the authors understand by autonomous movement is a force that works to confound and undermine contemporary systems of political and economic control. In certain
respects the power of autonomous movement has been the hidden secret of the history of class struggle. Far from being merely a reaction to the determinations of capitalist production, migration is a causative and constitutive force. Certainly, capitalism incites and exploits the mobility of its subjects, but their mobility always and ultimately exceeds it. For this reason, autonomous movement is the foremost expression of the collective, potential subject they call the multitude.

Autonomous movement is what defines the place proper to the multitude. Increasingly less will passports or legal documents be able to regulate our movements across borders. A new geography is established by the multitude as the productive flows of bodies define new rivers and ports. The cities of the earth will become at once great deposits of cooperating humanity and locomotives for circulation, temporary residences and networks of the mass distribution of living humanity (Hardt and Negri 2000: 396-7).

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Hardt and Negri push the theme of autonomous movement in a particular direction. Drawing on a particular interpretation of Deleuze and Guatarri’s nomadology which emphasizes the deterritorializing power of migration, in their hands autonomous migration becomes nothing less than the principal motive force in the passage through Empire to a new globalized citizenship. For it is through the innumerable, heteroclite pathways that migrants forge that ‘the multitude gains the power to affirm its autonomy, travelling and expressing itself through an apparatus of widespread, transversal territorial reappropriation’ (Hardt and Negri 2000: 398). For Hardt and Negri, the concept of autonomous migration does much of the work that class struggle once did within Marxian theories of social transformation, and not without the latter’s eschatological tendencies. Following Walzer, Bull has noted that long before the rise of socialism and its revolutionary ideology, it was the myth of Exodus which provided social actors with an image of radical change. A striking feature of Empire is that one sees how ‘revolutionary ideology is being translated back into the language of Exodus’ (Bull 2004: 219).

But not all readings of autonomous migration burden it with quite the same degree of historical purpose or political expectation. In my view the kind of research that is in certain respects more valuable are those inquiries which, in contrast to Hardt and Negri’s grandiose scheme, register a more modest and, perhaps, minor understanding of autonomous migration. Here I have in mind a range of sociological, ethnographic and anthropological studies. While their authors do not always explicitly identify their work with the idea of autonomous migration, their findings are very much consistent with its main emphases. For they patiently document many of the ways in which unauthorized migrants and stateless persons actively negotiate the world of borders, work, social relationships, bureaucratic entanglements, refugee hearings and much else. Through their various disclosures - showing that the women whom official reports and media narratives represent as victims of ‘trafficking’ are in fact far from being helpless pawns but actually agents who make strategic calculations even in the most difficult circumstances (Andrijasevic 2003); examining the particular tactics which migrants employ to achieve a status of residence in a particular city like Rotterdam (Engbersen 2001); or revealing how it could be that even the apparent ‘invisibility’ of certain migrants is not straightforward but in many cases a status that has to be artfully maintained and reproduced as a survival strategy (Coutin 2003), - studies such as these reveal the extent to which unauthorized migration is an intensely strategic, negotiated phenomenon possessing an irreducibly subjective dimension.
This detailed appreciation of the autonomy and subjectivity of migration

has developed largely in isolation from debates about homo sacer and the camp. In concluding this section we might ask whether a greater recognition of these manifold expressions of agency would challenge the gloomy view of the camp – whether understood as an archipelago of actual spaces of detention and removal, or as a metaphor for the contemporary political condition. Would it unsettle the image of the camp as a regime that captures its subjects within systems of biopolitical management? If even the stateless and the undocumented reveal themselves to be capable of negotiating and shaping their own circumstances, if only in limited and difficult ways, does this suggest it is too soon to declare that we are all ‘virtually homines sacri’ (Agamben 1998: 115)?

Perhaps not. Followers of Agamben would probably point out that while the kinds of struggle mentioned above do indeed go on, it is only rarely that they challenge the fundamental ‘logic’ of sovereign power. Particular migrants may well succeed in gaining residence or even formal citizenship status; their social pressure may indeed underpin the granting of immigration ‘amnesties’ which regularize ‘hidden’ sections of the population; but the basic logic of the camp, the distinctions it draws between politically-qualified and bare life, remain firmly in place. Hence, Edkins and Pin-Fat insist that it is only particular kinds of resistance that can unsettle sovereign power (Edkins and Pin-Fat 2004). They highlight two tactics. The first involves the refusal to make distinctions, to draw lines and to differentiate the deserving and the undeserving, the refugee and the economic migrant. The second is the tactic of adopting the position of bare life in order to politicize it. This latter move is exemplified by ‘the nonviolent protester who uses their own body to obstruct and draw attention to the violence of the state’. It finds one of its most iconic expressions in the image of the lone demonstrator, shopping bag in hand, standing in front of the tank in Tiananmen Square (Edkins and Pin-Fat 2004: 16).

It seems to me quite valid to emphasize that the social and political struggles of migrants and their allies do not necessarily challenge the space of the camp but can in many circumstances merely reshape the lines which define it. At the same time, however, such a position risks a repeat of the mistake made by all those who, at the height of Western socialism, posed the relationship between reform and revolution in rather stark either/or terms. That is, it threatens to ignore, or worse, dismiss a whole range of practices and acts on the grounds that they do not qualify as sufficiently radical. What is needed, I want to insist, is a greater openness and sensitivity to the diverse, but often relatively minor ways in which migrants are constituted, and constitute themselves not just as subjects capable of acting, but as political subjects. With this in mind, I turn to the theme of acts of citizenship.


A particularly nuanced reading of the significance of the phenomenon of undocumented migration for citizenship studies is suggested by recent work that develops the theme of acts of citizenship. The great benefit of this idea, as I see it, is not only to theorize the politics of citizenship beyond the realm of formal entitlements, rights, and laws, for this is already done by research into ‘de facto’ or ‘informal citizenship’ (Sassen 2004). What is especially important about the idea of acts of citizenship is the insistence that our focus should be not already-existing
citizens, nor, for that matter, non-citizens. Indeed, the appropriate focus should not be actors, per se, but those constitutive moments, performances, enactments and events when a new identity, substance or relationship of citizenship is brought into existence. This move allows us to better understand situations where those subjects lacking formal rights or recognition constitute themselves – with or without the help of others – as capable of acting like citizens, and meriting treatment as citizens. Moreover, the emphasis on acts serves to draw our attention to moments of interruption, instances when something, however small and seemingly marginal, is changed, possibly for the first time. As Isin (2007) has emphasized, to speak of acts rather than, say, practices or habits, is to emphasize not that which is repeated or ingrained but those singular moments when action manages to accomplish a ‘rupture in the given’.

Building on the work of Rancière and Honig, Nyers (2003) has shown how the political movements of people without status can be illuminated by this perspective on citizenship. Taking the example of the Comité d’Action des Sans-Statuts in Montreal he shows how their political actions intrude upon the political order and challenge some of its most deeply held assumptions. Through inventive acts such as unannounced ‘delegation visits’ to the offices of Immigration Canada, this movement unsettles the dominant idea that refugees are passive objects who should have no political say in their own fate. A similar tactic of interruption is described by Chaterjee (2004) when he identifies a ‘politics of the governed’ by which squatters, migrants and homeless persons have managed to interrupt the official space and conventions of politics in Calcutta. Yet, as I hinted above, acts of citizenship are not confined to explicitly political undertakings. Seemingly minor and mundane things might also be considered in this way. For instance, the decision made by immigrants to set up soccer leagues in big US cities might also be considered an act of citizenship, not least because it has the potential to ‘socially appropriate and culturally recompose public space’ (Rodriguez 1995: 27).

There is much to recommend this line of analysis. While it shares with Agamben an appreciation that there are lines and manoeuvres that capture subjects outside political and legal space, it moves on from this observation in ways that are politically constructive. For its focus is not so much on the various mechanisms of capture (such as the camp) but rather the multiple ways in which such sovereign spacings are unsettled. By investigating those moments when subjects constitute themselves as meriting recognition as citizens, a focus on acts of citizenship has the potential to reveal that the sovereign lines associated with the camp are considerably more mutable than might otherwise be assumed.

But it seems to me that at least one important oversight could follow from this focus on acts of citizenship. While it is certainly not inherent in the thematic focus, there is a risk that in placing acts of citizenship at the centre of our analytical strategies one specific kind of politics will be overlooked. I have in mind here a politics in which subjects refuse the identity of citizen, perhaps because they explicitly reject the rights, responsibilities and commitments that are associated with the citizen, or out of preference for other identities. My thinking on this point has been shaped by Hindess’s (2004) recent criticisms of what we might call the rather ‘enchanted’ view which still prevails within much scholarly writing about citizenship. Without dismissing the very real benefits which citizenship does bestow on many of its bearers, he urges that we bear in mind cases where citizenship is not sought, and sometimes explicitly or tactically refused. Judgments about the merits of being a citizen are, he insists, always ‘circumstantial’. Very often marginalized groups and peoples have historically viewed the status of citizenship as something desirable. But this depends on the particular historical and political context: ‘there may well be circumstances in which the decision could go the other way. It is not difficult to find cases in
which people appear to have preferred a way of life that did not involve citizenship, or involved it only in a weaker form’ (Hindess 2004: 307). Hindess offers a wealth of cases to illustrate this point – including whole communities of citizens who had lived within or on the fringes of the Roman Empire, but seemed to prefer a life outside its institutions; Europeans who deserted their own civilizing missions in favour of a life amongst or alongside native people; and certain communities of indigenous people today who either reject the ‘supposed benefits of citizenship’ in modern states in favour of their own way of life, or seek some combination of the two.

Theoretical development of the idea of acts of citizenship would benefit from taking on board these cautions about the merits of citizenship. In order to better understand those kinds of events where subjects do not act in the name of citizenship, and where political commitment to a certain kind of citizenship is either ambiguous or explicitly refused, I want to suggest a conceptual supplement to ‘acts of citizenship’. This is the idea of acts of demonstration. By foregrounding this theme I want to develop a concept that will be useful in making sense of certain political situations. These occur when an injustice is revealed, a relationship of power is contested, or a particular wrong is protested, but when the identity of the subjects at the heart of the protest is left relatively open.

Quite often we will find that the field of acts of citizenship and acts of demonstration overlaps considerably. To take one example from the world of migration politics, consider the unprecedented 2006 immigrant protests in the United States. Mobilizing as many as three million ‘illegal aliens’ and their allies in most of the major cities of the US, these rallies practised what Lomnitz calls a ‘politics of visibility’. For the rallies demonstrated to the American public not only that undocumented people are living and working in their midst but henceforth they refuse to remain fugitive, underground, and hyper-exploited. But these acts of demonstration can also be regarded as acts of citizenship since they typically call for greater recognition – including the recognition of cultural difference – and, through mechanisms like regularization, inclusion within the polity. This combination of demonstration and insurgent citizenship was framed succinctly by marchers’ signs which read: ‘Today We March: Tomorrow We Vote’ (Lomnitz 2007: 439).

However, it is not always the case that acts of demonstration are simultaneously or logically acts of citizenship. Not always does contestation find expression in the move which says: ‘See/hear us, recognize us, respect us, empower us!’ In certain circumstances it is important to identify that act of demonstration which refuses the identity of citizen, and does so in a way that opens space for other political possibilities. To illustrate and develop this point, the remainder of this chapter considers one particular act of demonstration, an act which returns us to the scene of Sangatte with which we began. The act that interests me is the project of mapping the refugee centre at Sangatte, a project undertaken by the group An Architektur.

**Mapping the Territory of (Non-)Citizenship**

An Architektur is a collective actor and the name of a journal associated with a group of critical architects based in Berlin. Founded in 2002 by certain members of the architects’ collective ‘freies fach’ (Willemsen 2006), An Architektur has to date published seventeen issues dealing with ‘particular political and social aspects of architecture and the city under
current capitalist conditions’ (An Architektur n.d.). These range from the investigation of strategic sites at the very centre of contemporary geopolitics – for instance, issue 04 investigates the ‘extraterritorial’ space of the infamous US Naval base at Guantanamo - to the management of everyday space in the city. The latter is exemplified by issue 02, entitled ‘Anti-Vandal’. This issue examines the activities of private companies whose product is the securing of unoccupied urban buildings. Besides publishing a magazine, members of An Architektur have also been active as the initiators and organizers of the first Camp for Oppositional Architecture, which took place in 2004 in Berlin’s Wedding district. Staged in a vacant factory and office complex, this event sought to explore possibilities for resistance in the fields of architecture and planning.

It is quite significant that the first issue of the journal was dedicated to the work of the French sociologist and philosopher, Henri Lefebvre. For Lefebvre’s pathbreaking observations on the place of different forms of space and spatialization within the reproduction of capitalism provide a point of departure for the kinds of projects An Architektur undertakes (Willemsen 2006). In particular, they take seriously Lefebvre’s insistence that a critical analysis of spatial relations offers crucial insights about the proper character of a particular form of political order (An Architektur 2003).

But a second point of reference, and source of practical orientation for this collective is the work of the British historical geographer, John Harley (Willemsen 2006). Writing mostly in the 1980s, Harley made a series of important interventions in the field of geography when he brought certain insights from post-structuralist theory to bear upon the dominant conception of cartography. Harley argued that far from being an objective and purely communicative medium, cartography was a representational practice embedded within power relations (Crampton 2001). His call for a deconstruction of map-making resonates with the work of a growing number of artists, activists, situationists and theorists, such as Bureau d’Etudes, and Hackitectura. These groups/projects experiment with the basic forms of maps, organigrams and flow-charts to devise representational practices adequate to the critique of contemporary forms of politics and power. Inasmuch as An Architektur uses map-making to ‘make visible the social relations inscribed in space that are invisible in normal maps’, its map-making could be situated within this project of ‘writing counter-geography’ (Biemann 2003).

How has An Architektur engaged with questions of space and migration? Published in 2002, Issue 03 of An Architektur is entitled ‘Grenzgeografie Sangatte’ (An Architektur 2002). It utilizes on-site observations which members of the group made at Calais and Sangatte, as well as information drawn from news reports, the Red Cross and other refugee organizations. I noted at the outset that at the start of the twenty-first century, Sangatte had come to stand as a signifier for Europe’s ‘crisis’ of ‘immigration and asylum’. In the period from 1999 to 2002 it had featured prominently in a torrent of newspaper and TV coverage. An Architektur’s coverage of this event is markedly different from the dominant representations of Sangatte. In what respects does this particular intervention into the mass-mediated ‘border spectacle’ (De Genova 2002) of Sangatte constitute an act of demonstration? In what ways is this act simultaneously expressive of a certain solidarity with the migrants and refugees at Sangatte, but reluctant to confer on its subjects any fixed or unambiguous identity? What political significance might we accord to the critical space that this act opens up?
Illegal Border Crossing

Out of the 50,000 refugees that passed the camp, about 85% managed to reach Great Britain. But due to the tightened safety measures, they then had to undertake several, mostly unsuccessful tries. Directly on the camp space, escape agents offered information on how to pass the border (1).

Until the end of the 1990s the ferry (2) from Calais to Dover loaded with containers and, in these days, also with trains was the main opportunity to reach Great Britain. Until 2002 trucks were becoming more important. The surrounding of the industrial area (3) with its petrol stations and truck parking over night offered various possibilities to get on the trucks without being noticed. The same applied to the other petrol station and truck stop along the highways. (4, 5)

**Figure 1 Illegal Border Crossing**
*Source: An Architektur (2002)*

With the tightening of safety measures at the ferry station, the efforts to pass the border were shifting to the area of the Eurotunnel which also controlled more and more. In order to reach the terminal area (7), fences up to 4 m high, some of them electrified, had to be passed. Blankets were used as a means of protection against the electric shock. There also were efforts to jump on trains from bridges (8), to jump onto passing freight (10) or passenger trains (11) or to cross the tunnel on foot (9). As a consequence of the attempts to immigrate, several severe accidents have happened, twelve refugees died. On the cemetery in Croquettes (11), five graves of partly unknown refugees exist.
An Architektur’s border geography of Sangatte consists of nine maps and diagrams with titles like ‘History of the refugee camp’, ‘Ground plan of the camp’, and ‘Detail tunnel entrance’. In one it is the improvised living quarters of the refugees within the vast warehouse that is represented. Numbered annotations draw the reader’s eye to mundane but telling little details: police buses permanently parked opposite a large rubbish bin; an open space at the back of the warehouse serving as a play area and a temporary mosque. Another map (Figure 1) locates the migrant centre in relation to key elements in the transportation infrastructure of the area such as the ferry terminal, truck stops and petrol stations, and the railway lines which pass in and out of the Eurotunnel near Sangatte. Suggestive of a topography of escape attempts, this map charts the different routes which the migrants took from the warehouse, showing how some sought to break into the railway terminal and climb onto trains while others targeted nearby service stations in a bid to infiltrate trucks heading for Britain. Still another map (Figure 2) shows in meticulous detail the kinds of security provisions that the authorities have deployed around the entrance to the Eurotunnel, including barbed wire, electric fences, spotlights and video surveillance.

What are we to make of these representations? Certainly it would be possible to relate these to Agamben’s theme of homo sacer. After all, isn’t the converted warehouse an exemplary instance of a camp – an abandoned structure that is hurriedly and expeditiously pressed into service for the purpose of containing a population for which the social and legal order seems to have no place? Re-presenting the Eurotunnel - itself a potent symbol of a technologically interconnected Europe – An Architektur reveals a zone where certain classes of person become captured outside the European space of free movement. But the maps could also be read as evidence for the hypotheses of autonomous migration. For they speak to the determination of the migrants to find a way, somehow, by whatever means, to elude the system of border control, and pursue their chosen destination, in this case the shores of England. The great majority will fail, but not all.

But I think such a reading would tend still to understate the status of the maps and diagrams as interventions in their own right. It would miss the way in which An Architektur might be considered as an act which intervenes in, and re-presents the space opened up by the migrants in the course of their confrontation with national and European authorities and commercial actors like the railway companies. Here I think it is important to reflect on the aesthetic style and sensibility which An Architektur cultivates.

Perhaps the first thing that strikes the viewer is the abstract, technical and apparently neutral character of the plans and diagrams. They are intended to be ‘somewhat abstract yet comprehensible’ (An Architektur 2003). Yet there is more going on here. At first glance they could almost be the product of officialdom: a set of diagrams used in the planning of the Eurotunnel and its environs; a series of maps designed to chart a space of transportation, organize its elements, diagram its flows, and secure its processes. Yet the maps are not neutral. As An Architektur explains in an interview (2003), all
Detail Tunnel Entrance
Chain link fence, partially reinforced with barbed wire and black wire (1), electric fence (2), spot lights and video cameras (3), metal safeguard on both sides of the bridge (4), flood light (5), surveillance station (6)
maps are necessarily selective and partial, diagramming some features, suppressing others. Even if their immediate appearance belies such selectivity, maps encode particular points of view, and assume particular ends and objectives on the part of their users. A tourist map is quite different from a map used for property acquisition or security. But in the diagram called ‘illegal border crossing’ (Figure 1) it is not the space of tourism or business that is charted but the shifting pathways of the migrants, as they move back and forth from the improvised camp to the railway tracks, the ferry station, and other sites relevant to their quest for mobility. It seems that at least some of An Architektur’s maps imagine the migrants themselves as their users. Given that these migrants have no sanctioned place in the political order, and only appear in social space as a scandalous, quasi-criminal figure, the production of such a map must count as a political act. For it insists that migrants are present at the scene of Sangatte not just as objects, but also, like any other user of maps, as purposeful subjects.

Continuing with the theme of the style of representation, I want to note how we might read An Architektur as practitioners of a certain form of simulation. It is not uncommon for political groups to protest the securitization of borders and the marginalization of migrants by utilizing shocking images of the conditions in which they are forced to live, perhaps portraying a humanitarian disaster. An Architektur avoids this idiom. As though mindful of the way in which scandalous images of desperate migrants can all too easily be re-inscribed within discourses of law and order, and used to underpin the call for still tougher immigration controls, An Architektur eschews the conventional grammar of outrage or denunciation. Instead, theirs is a potentially more subversive form of protest because of how it appropriates the iconography of technical design and technocratic administration in order to make its point.

These acts of appropriation are not just a matter of developing a new language of protest, one that is less vulnerable to immediate recuperation by mainstream discourses. It is also a matter of how one fashions a way to represent what are in many ways novel forms and experiences of migration. Here I want to note that the representational strategy of An Architektur appears to parallel the migration strategies of its subjects. In both cases it is a matter of infiltrating a given medium and making it work for different ends. Lacking the requisite identity papers, or simply the ‘right’ nationality, the migrants who pass through Sangatte have difficulty practicing the kind of mobility available to most citizens of the EU and other wealthy regions. Like countless itinerants worldwide, ‘freedom of movement’ cannot be taken for granted but has to be seized. It has to be bought at inflated prices from ‘smugglers’. It has to be taken by the tactics of the stowaway, the forger and the bribe. Quite often it takes the form of ‘contained mobility’ (Biemann 2004) – the cramped and often lethal movement that belongs to the individual smuggled into the shipping container; the mobility which requires its living subject to mimic the lifeless form of the commodity. Hence there is a kind of equivalence between the subversive and mimetic representational style of An Architektur, and the fact that our political culture has forced the very act of movement to become a subversive activity.

If my first point has concerned the representational style of the maps, a second point concerns their empirical character. An Architektur does not make the claim that its maps are ‘objective’. For instance, they insist that they do not attempt to achieve a direct representation of spaces (An Architektur 2003). But in as much as the generation of the maps entails certain activities of careful investigation, observation and measurement conducted at a particular locale, it can be said that they certainly are empirical. The viewer cannot but be impressed by the
meticulous detail with which the interior of the camp, or the entrance to the Eurotunnel has been recorded. For instance, in the case of the latter (Figure 2), each spotlight and video camera is carefully represented.

But why do these little details matter? What is the point of this seemingly painstaking labour of investigation? What is achieved by documenting the movements of the migrants and the counter-tactics on the part of the authorities in such abstract, diagrammatic terms? I want to suggest that in adopting this particular mode of representation An Architektur is actually constituting Sangatte as a relatively unknown – but not unknowable – space. Sangatte may be situated geographically near the old sea frontier between England and France but through their own practice An Architektur relocate it at a different frontier-space: the frontier of knowledge about new forms of migration. This is an act which disturbs established narratives about unauthorized migration. A great deal of commentary on Sangatte inscribed it within narratives that are already known and all too familiar. Migrants are either expressions of lawlessness and crime, or heroic, nomadic subjects. But An Architektur seems to be saying: we are confronted here with a relatively new and unfamiliar situation, for which we presently possess at best only heuristic concepts. Their graphic and empirical mode of representation serves to constitute Sangatte as a sort of experimental site. It becomes the scene of an encounter whose terms, forms and identities are not to be determined in advance. Rendering this encounter in the form of a mapping at once marks its present status as a kind of terra incognita, while gesturing towards the possibility of a better understanding of this phenomenon.

My final point concerns the identities of the different actors here. With this point we can elaborate the theme of acts of demonstration. As Andrew Barry has argued, novel light is cast on the act of political demonstration once it is examined alongside the kind of demonstration that is more often associated with the world of science and technology, where particular truths are demonstrated by scientific experts in the context of the laboratory or the anatomy lecture theatre. The point is that whether in politics or scientific life, the act of demonstration requires particular ethical and technical practices. In both cases it is a matter of ‘making visible a phenomenon to be witnessed by others’ (Barry 1999: 77). If the production of these maps and diagrams can be understood as an act of demonstration, this is because demonstration is not straightforward but an event that always has to be conducted under particular conditions and in the presence of particular witnesses.

But who are the witnesses, and what are they witnessing? Let us deal with the What before returning to the Who. One of the most interesting and significant features of An Architektur’s demonstration of Sangatte, I want to suggest, is its refusal to ascribe a strong sense of identity to the migrants. From the text appended to the maps it is clear that An Architektur acts in solidarity with these migrants. This much is clear from the overall political tone of their writing, and the use of specific phrases like ‘Fortress Europe’ and ‘the absurd socio-spatial geography of control’. At the same time, however, the project refrains from making strong assertions about the political and social identity of the migrants. There are no claims that they are quasi-citizens, victims, foreigners, nomads, etc. Of course this might be regarded as a somewhat irresponsible act of abstention on the part of An Architektur, a refusal to take an intellectual and political position. But it might also be regarded as act of political modesty that purposefully leaves open the question of the identity of the actors. If so, this could actually be considered a timely and genuinely political move. For it resists the political urge to impose identity upon a
fluid and ambiguous scene. It refuses the tendency in public as well as much academic debate to proceed as though we already know who and what we are dealing with.

And so to the Who, and the question of the witness. For the question remains: who are these maps and diagrams - this Grenzgeografie - intended for? The point is that as a practice, every demonstration requires a witness who is qualified to confirm its evidence. Can we say then that an act of demonstration is that particular kind of event when the presence and the identity of the witness is uncertain, and when the prior existence of the witness and the status of the event as a demonstration, cannot be taken for granted? If so, then acts of demonstration are those acts which appeal to an audience which is not already there. Here I want to speculate that with its avowedly empirical style, and its technical aesthetic, An Architektur is appealing to the possibility of a different kind of public than the one which presently observes the spectacle of migration - a public that is ‘yet to come’.

It is both protesting the inadequacy of the current forms of publicity which dominate the politics of migration, and gesturing towards the need for a public space in which the genuine and intractable questions of migration might be discussed in a relatively open-ended and perhaps even experimental manner. This is perhaps why this political intervention is somewhat ambiguous about the identity or the purpose of the migrants themselves. This ambiguity may frustrate those looking for a firm statement of political allegiance, and an unequivocal appeal for migrants’ rights. But the point is not to add one more voice seeking to stabilize their identity as this or that, and to reproduce the existing dichotomies (citizens/aliens, legal/illegal, villains/heroes and so on). Instead, it is to make more explicit the limitations of existing modes of knowledge and dialogue; limitations that are all the more urgent in the face of new forms of migration for which there is not only an absence of simple or immediate answers, but also of adequate concepts.

If it is indeed the case that the particular act of demonstration we have examined puts at stake the limitations of our concepts of political community, then the territory of (non-)citizenship to which my subtitle refers should not be mistaken for a settled identity. It should not be taken to refer to a specific status or a group of people called non-citizens, the ‘other’ of ‘the’ citizen. Instead, it can be interpreted as a reference to the space of possibility which at any given moment surrounds our political identities. In his excellent essay on Foucault’s method, Paul Veyne (1997: 158, his emphasis) writes: ‘It is unquestionably an odd thing, well worth the attention of a philosopher, this capacity of human beings to remain unaware of their limits, their exceptionality, not to see that there is emptiness around them, to believe that at any given moment they are ensconced in the plenitude of reason.’ The act of demonstration carries with it the hope and the possibility of a public that can register the conditions of its own exceptionality more fully.

Notes

1 I am grateful to the editors for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. I also wish to thank An Architektur for allowing me to reproduce their maps here, and Arne Rückert for translating their interviews and statements into English.

2 According to Faist (2002) issues become meta-issues when they operate as master signifiers within symbolic politics. He argues that ‘migration’ is today a meta-issue because of the way politicians and others invoke it as an explanation for countless different concrete problems, ranging from housing shortages to failing schools. Something similar can be said of ‘terrorism’.
Amongst the best academic discussions of this idea are Mezzadra (2004), Mezzadra and Neilson (2003) and Rodriguez (1996).

On the apparent ‘failure’ of border control in the United States, see Cornelius (2005).

Answering the question of what a Foucauldian account of the French Revolution might look like, Keith Michael Baker (1994: 190) has suggested it ‘would surely be a disenchanted one, seeking to reveal the mechanisms of power within the discourse of emancipation’. Conversely, an enchanted view of citizenship is one that readily accepts the progressivist assumptions embedded in this concept. It is a view that fails to interrogate the power relations and effects associated with what we might call governance through citizenship.

Deleuze and Guatarri (1987: 345) speak of a ‘people yet to come’ in relation to creative interventions which act to destratify dominant forms of peoplehood. If ‘the public’ is already an effect of processes which territorialize and control a people – think of the technologies of ‘public opinion’ or ‘public relations’ – then my notion of a public yet to come is nothing other than a reference to the possibility of minor forms of public(ity) whose task it is to disrupt the dominant forms of expression associated with ‘the public’.

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