Anti-Political Economy: Cartographies of “Illegal Immigration” and the Displacement of the Economy

‘What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real…. The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group, or social formation. It can be drawn on a wall, conceived of as a work of art, constructed as a political action or as a meditation’.
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 12)

‘Who left the Door Open?’

On September 20, 2004, the US news weekly *Time* published a special issue dedicated to the issue now known as border security. The cover story was titled ‘Who left the Door Open?’, and announced that the issue was to be devoted to ‘the lack of national security at the United States’ borders’ (Barlett and Steel 2004). The general thrust of the special issue was that a mere 3 years on from the events of September 11, and despite the massive investment made in homeland security, ‘sneaking into the US is scandalously easy – and on the rise’. As corroboration, *Time* estimated that ‘the number of illegal aliens flooding into the US…will total 3 million – enough to fill 22,000 Boeing 737-7000 airliners’. But this is not the only scandal reported. If these ‘illegals’ could once have been assumed to be nearly all Mexican, today ‘a small but sharply growing number come from other countries, including those with large populations hostile to the US’.
Having established the potential for danger at the border, the special issue proceeds to carry out a sort of audit of the damage and the risks associated with such a leaky border, and asks plaintively: ‘why does the US fail to protect itself?’ and ‘is this the perfect cover for terrorists?’
The article is full of assumptions and assertions that a critical inquiry into migration today would surely want to interrogate – not least the idea that more intense forms of policing the state’s borders are really conducive to the protection of its citizens, not to mention the lives of migrants. However, it is not the article but rather one particular map – one of a number of graphics accompanying the special issue – that I find interesting. Entitled ‘Breaking Point’ (Figure 1), it

![Figure 1 ‘Breaking Point’ map](source.png)

seems intended to convey a sense of imminent crisis at the US/Mexico border. There are a number of interesting features here. First, there is the fact that the graphic places the observer in terms of an imaginary and seemingly impossible viewpoint that is oblique to the landscape, as though the viewer were piloting a plane approaching the US Southwest. The southwestern section of the border is to the foreground while the vast landmass of North America rolls out towards the horizon. The earth’s atmosphere is lightly etched in shades of blue on the horizon, contrasting sharply with the blackness of space beyond. It seems that ‘illegal immigration’ is happening not just in relation to US territory but within a quasi-planetary space – a slippage that Hardt and Negri (2000) would surely appreciate.
But another interesting feature of the map concerns its visual field which is largely dominated by geographical and natural features, such as deserts, mountain ranges and rivers. What geographers would call ‘political’ features are only faintly present. The US/Mexico border is certainly emphasized as a somewhat jagged line – drawn in red, just in case we miss the point. State lines and the occasional city are marked also. But much more prominent are the olive, grey and khaki shadings which convey a sense of the physical relief of this space; the lay of the land. In some respects it resembles a political topography rather than a political geography of ‘illegal immigration’ – a point I shall return to later.

There are other features that deserve to be mentioned. For instance, there are four boxes of text which draw our attention to particular sites along the border, and which elucidate the problems with ‘immigration’ occurring at those sites. Many of these are referenced and developed in the articles which make up the special issue. There is the small border town of Bisbee. Its tiny hospital ‘may’ be forced to close because of the cost of caring for ‘illegal immigrants’. There are the ranches at the border losing cattle when fences are cut. There is the Tohono O’odham reservation whose facilities are overtaxed by the migrants, its land ‘trashed’. And as if to capture the depth of the scandal of the leaky border we learn that not even the army is immune from disruption at the hands of the ‘illegals’. Fort Huachuca may be a ‘top-secret intelligence training ground’ but it is also a ‘thoroughfare for smugglers’. What these little boxes and their mini-dramas seem to be saying is this: Americans may be divided along lines of class, region, race and work, but at least in the case of those citizens who populate the borderlands, there is commonality around one point: all experience a common suffering at the hands of ‘illegal immigrants’.

Maps like this are common if not ubiquitous within press, TV and Internet coverage of migration issues in general, and especially the type of migration that is given the problematic title of ‘illegal immigration’. They also quite frequently accompany official reports and policy documents. Certainly it could be argued that such maps contribute in minor but not insignificant ways to the wider symbolic and semantic field within which political questions of human mobility are debated today. Yet such maps have been largely ignored by critical scholarship about migration. While there is now a sizeable literature concerning the political and social construction of immigration, this tends to concentrate on the production of identities at the level of written text and speech. The growing literature on securitization of migration is a case in point (Buonfino 2004; Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002). For all its sophistication, this literature has tended to privilege the speech act as its model of analysis and pays scant attention to the visual mediation and construction of security situations (Williams 2003). 2

Migration Cartography

This chapter seeks to partially remedy this rather strange oversight by focusing on what I am calling the cartography of ‘illegal immigration’. Simply put, it argues that we should take such maps more seriously. To this end, the chapter will treat these cartographic inscriptions as irreducible elements in their own right, and not merely pictorial decorations or illustrative features for textual practices. One of the principal aims of the chapter is to call attention to the
phenomenon of migration cartography and to demonstrate that migration cartography merits considerably more critical attention than it has hitherto received.

It goes without saying that there are several ways in which we might frame such an analysis. One approach would be to examine migration map-making in relation to questions of the production and legitimation of state power and territoriality. In a recent work exploring various imaginings of the state, Mark Neocleous takes up the theme of how political rule is legitimated by the idea that every state, and ‘its’ people, has a ‘home’, namely, a particular territory. He identifies several ways in which the idea of territory as home is concretely produced. One of these is through a series of categorical distinctions that are inscribed in law but also popular imagination. These distinctions affirm the state as the home of the citizen in part by marking such identities as the refugee, the alien, and the vagabond as dis-placed and transgressive subjects. Another technique is the map. Through its capacity to dominate the political imagination, this ‘crucial political technology of space’, Neocleous avers, is responsible for nothing less than legitimating ‘the great movement of territorialization through which the whole earth has been turned into an object of state stewardship’ (2003: 124). Here we might observe that the peculiarity of migration cartography is precisely that it combines these two techniques of domesticating the polity. For its essence is to graft a representation of outsiders onto an apparently objective depiction of ‘the shape and territorial outline of the state’ (Neocleous 2003: 123). Given the kinds of emotional and political effects it is thereby capable of generating, perhaps it should come as no surprise that migration cartography has come to occupy a prominent place within popular and official discourses about immigration.

While I will certainly touch on themes of territoriality, this is not the primary line of analysis I pursue in this paper. Instead, I want to make a different reading of the phenomenon of migration mapping, one that relates quite closely to the theme of cultural political economy. This paper will argue that as a corollary to the study of the cultural constitution of the economic, it is also important to understand how cultural practices and artefacts can play a significant role in limiting, containing and sometimes suppressing public and political perceptions of the economic. Borrowing a term from Barry (2002) this is a phenomenon that I call anti-political economy.

My first major section explores some possible meanings of anti-political economy, and how it relates to cultural political economy. Here I distinguish between two possible interpretations of anti-political economy. The first, following Barry (2002), is about translating political controversies into technical objectives that might be pursued by relatively de-dramatized means within the space called ‘the economy’. The requirement that construction companies observe certain building codes when fabricating houses or roads is an example of this sense of anti-political economy. Without standards, every new house would carry with it the potential of sparking local controversy or even public outcry on the grounds it was structurally unsound, too high so that it shadowed neighbouring properties, or perhaps not consistent with the prevailing architectural style of the neighbourhood. Standards, regulations and codes serve to limit political disagreement by ‘placing actions and objects (provisionally) outside the realm of public contestation, thereby regularizing the conduct of economic and social life, with both beneficial and negative consequences’ (Barry 2002: 271). This is not to say that the drafting of such regulations and codes is without political controversy. On the contrary, a passing familiarity with municipal politics indicates that a given proposal to change building or other codes will frequently be met with opposition from builders, environmentalists, community organizations,
and so forth. But the point is that once agreed upon, standards and codes serve to lessen the likelihood of constant politicization by providing guidelines for technical and economic activity.

The second sense of anti-political economy relates to what I call the move of non-identification. Here it is a case of understanding how certain economic moments and identities can be suppressed by other discourses and systems of meanings, and rendered non-economic. A particularly gendered notion of ‘housework’ can serve as an illustration of the move of non-identification. For example, by casting domestic work as the natural task of ‘housewives’, and a social responsibility of women, patriarchal discourse lessens the possibility that a wide range of activities undertaken in and around the household will be regarded as productive activity taking place within ‘the economy’ (cf. Waring 1988).

In the subsequent sections I consider a series of examples of the cartography of ‘illegal immigration’. Adapting Dalby and O’Tuathail’s (1998) useful typology of geopolitics, I identify three categories of representation within migration cartography: popular, official and radical. I argue that both the above interpretations of anti-political economy can prove useful in making sense of these cartographic practices, and the various ways in which they shape the meaning of key identities like ‘immigration’, ‘state’, ‘economy’ and ‘territory’. Most of my examples illustrate processes by which something called ‘illegal immigration’ is, on the one hand kept at a certain distance (if not completely detached) from that which our societies recognise as ‘the economic’, while on the other, maintained in an intimate relationship with themes of territory and security. Nevertheless, I want to argue that if migration cartography is often put to work in antipolitical ways, this is far from being inherent in the practice of mapping. This point is developed in a final section where I discuss an example of counter-mapping. This case suggests, if nothing else, that migration cartography is fast becoming a medium for critical, deconstructive and sometimes polemical interventions as well.

Before taking up the themes of anti-political and cultural economy, it is necessary to clarify my understanding of the ‘cultural’. Obviously the fact that there exist multiple ways of interpreting the cultural is a thread running through this volume. But in what sense are migration maps cultural? I don not think we should look for any kind of general answer to this question. Much depends on how we define culture, just as it depends on the kind of map in question. Much also depends on the use to which a given map is put. Hence, it is a matter of understanding the particular ways in which a given type of map might be said to have cultural aspects. While there are many ways in which maps could be related to culture, here I mention the two which seem most relevant to my project.

First, certain kinds of maps could be considered as cultural in the sense that they can be related to notions of lived, everyday life. The ubiquitous weather maps which close out the nightly newscast fit this description. Often appearing as nothing more than a background, they form part of the texture of everyday life. In quite subtle and not always acknowledged ways, they mediate our experience of the world. Just think of how weather maps privilege and construct national space. As Black (1997: 12) observes, you might live in Kent in the south of England, but because of the banal nationalism of weather reporting, you will likely be told more about the weather in distant Westmoreland than in nearby Pas-de-Calais. In other words, weather maps can often play a part in the production of the region or the nation as imagined community. While nowhere near as ubiquitous as weather maps, my sense is that a great deal of migration
cartography works in this way. Embedded in TV news and magazine reporting, it operates at the level of everyday life where, in subtle and not so subtle ways, it contributes to the perception of a ‘here’ and ‘there’, an ‘us’ and a ‘them’. Here, migration maps ‘demarcate divisions between self and other’, as Best and Paterson (Introduction, this volume) have put it; their effects readily translating into ‘logics of inclusion and exclusion, good and evil, powerful and powerless’.

But the cultural is relevant in a second sense. This is where the cultural is associated with the claim that any social practice involves shared understandings, meanings and assumptions that may be specific to a group or a time. To put it simply, maps are shot through with cultural assumptions. Maps rely on these assumptions in order to produce meaning. These assumptions may operate at the level of the convention. For instance, there is the use of blue to signify water. But they may operate through less formal, less visible mechanisms. For instance, there is a powerful association within western culture which links the above with the good or virtuous and the below with the base or profane. Think of the meaning of heaven and hell within Christian theology, or upstairs and downstairs, in the social world of the Victorian household. Perhaps it is due to the suspicion that this subtle spatial code permeates the mapping of Europe in relation to Africa that, as we will see in our example of radical cartography below, Hackitectura elects to invert many of its maps of the Mediterranean space (Pérez de Lama et al. 2006).

**Anti-Political Economy and Cultural Political Economy**

In their introduction to this project, Best and Paterson argue that conventional as well as critical strands of political economy have tended to overlook the role which cultural processes, practices and phenomena play in shaping economic objects. ‘Political economy, as conventionally understood, whether in neoclassical, public choice, institutionalist, statist, or Marxist terms, thus fails to fully explain its object because it abstracts political economy from its cultural constitution’ (Introduction). They insist that a better understanding of the cultural – a term they recognise as subject to a considerable range of interpretation – will make for a more powerful version of political economy. It will illuminate, among other things, the role which culture plays in shaping economic domains and the actors as well as the activities which populate those domains.

This does seem a very valid and important point to make, even if it could be argued that something resembling cultural political economy is already well underway amongst certain political and economic anthropologists. But rather than engage directly in the question of the cultural and its shaping of political economy, I want to explore what I see as a corollary of this hypothesis. This is to consider the place of cultural practices and formations in relation to anti-political economy. The project of cultural political economy should not confine its attention to the positive ways in which practices, objects and processes come to be considered as ‘economic’, or the role of the cultural in explaining economic transformations. In addition, this project needs to encompass the study of these practices, at once material and discursive, whose effect is to manage the distribution of the economic and its separation from the non-economic. Put differently, it needs to attend to the various ways in which the economic is contained, neutralized, displaced and in some cases made invisible. Paying attention to some of the everyday ways in which migration is mediated and made visible both at public and official levels, my study of migration maps is intended to illustrate this phenomenon of anti-political economy. But before I return to the maps, it is necessary to reflect a bit further on the idea of anti-political economy.
One place to start is with Ferguson’s political anthropology of international development policy. Focusing on Lesotho, Ferguson describes development practice in terms of an ‘anti-politics machine’. There are two aspects of this machine which he describes in terms of ‘instrument-effects’. The first is ‘the institutional effect of expanding bureaucratic state power’ (Ferguson 2006: 273). This expansion happens despite the fact that nearly all development projects are deemed by academics as ‘failures’ since they rarely meet their stated aims of alleviating poverty. The second is ‘the conceptual or ideological effect of depoliticizing both poverty and the state’ (Ferguson 2006: 273). This effect is the move which turns political issues into technical matters. Poverty, inequality, and starvation, become statistics and objectives to be mitigated. Instead of a conflict, one has administration. Foucault describes the modern prison system as a success despite the fact that it never managed to ‘solve’ the problem of crime. It is a success because in unplanned and only partially coordinated ways it has constituted a manageable and governable space of crime, populated by a discrete class of persons called the delinquent (Foucault 1977). In much the same way, Ferguson uses the machine metaphor to theorize development as a successful failure.

Rather like Ferguson, Barry (2002) is interested in these moments of translation. But Barry discusses technicalization more specifically in relation to themes of economic and environmental governance. Barry emphasizes a particular domain of technical practices which he calls ‘metrology’. The legal requirement for cars to undergo periodic emissions test is a good example of this. The emissions test has anti-political effects. For instance, it allows political objectives, such as the promotion of better air quality, to be projected onto a host of sites situated well beyond the state apparatus, such as the used-car lot. Particular political debates about pollution can be translated into technologically-mediated practices: has this car passed its emission test? Moreover, the possession of certification to this end will typically shape the market value of the car. In the spirit of actor-network theory, Barry shows that through testing and certification practices, a range of actors including buyers, sellers, mechanics and scientists, are enrolled in strategies of environmental governance, but through formally non-political mechanisms.

But Barry brings something else to the idea of anti-political economy. First, he insists that one should not denounce the anti-political in blanket terms. If disagreement is a fundamental and pervasive feature of human life, then anti-politics – understood as mechanisms to manage disagreement, and make collective life viable – is in fact quite necessary. Hence it is a matter of differentiating between different forms of anti-politics. There are anti-political forms which might be considered as respecting and promoting certain forms of democratic experience (e.g., rules concerning the political impartiality of the civil service), and those which do not (e.g., certain forms of state censorship). Second, regimes of metrology are not as robust as certain accounts of technicalization (including, perhaps, Ferguson’s Foucauldian version) presume. They are often fragile because they are susceptible to politicisation. Metrology can become a surface of politics in its own right. For instance, making ‘illegal immigration’ into something statistical may induce certain depoliticization effects since it encourages the idea that this ‘thing’ has a quasi-natural existence in the world (like annual rainfall), and as such, can be governed once we devise the optimal policy ‘solution’. Yet, statistics can become a site of politicisation in its own right, such as whenever questions get raised about their accuracy. But in addition, the field of such statistics can be extended – to count not only the rate of ‘illegal entries’ or ‘apprehensions’, but death at the...
border: the human toll exacted by particular regimes of immigration control. In such ways, the
statistics of ‘illegal immigration’ becomes a field of struggle.

While my understanding of anti-political economy is particularly indebted to Barry’s
development of the theme, I think it is important to identify a second aspect of the field of anti-political economy. This is less about nullifying politics/disagreement within the economy (e.g. the potential for political disagreement between vendor and buyer in the used car salesroom), or purifying it from political contamination, but more about all those situations when affairs are conducted in ways which refuse, fail, neglect or consciously repress the identification of things as economic. I propose to call this second aspect the non-identification of the economic.

A classic case of such non-identification concerns household work. Feminist scholarship and activism has, of course, a long and lively history of engagement on just this matter. Marilyn Waring’s (1988) study of the UN’s System of National Accounts makes the point particularly clearly at the level of institutional and statistical practices. This system, which became the template for national economic accounting practices on an international scale following the Second World War, served to establish official definitions of what was to count as economic activity and what would not, who was in the labour force, who was not, and so on. Hence Waring reveals an anti-political economy embedded at the level of economic theory and statistical practice itself. Equally significantly, because of the way it is embedded in official practices, she shows that this non-identification of the economic will be reproduced unknowingly and almost automatically nearly every time these statistics are used.

For my purposes, there are two points that can be taken from Waring’s discussion of the institutional power to define the economic, and conversely the extra-economic. The first is that non-identification is an active process and not merely an absence of recognition. Hence, the location of the household outside the economy is mediated by the immense cultural work which renders household work as something else — for example, as ‘care’, that natural responsibility and competence of persons identified as mothers and wives. Second, the point is not that there is a true definition of the economic by which everything else can be measured. Rather, the identification and non-identification of the economic is always mediated by politics. If it becomes possible to identify certain patriarchal practices in terms of anti-political economy, this is because feminist political interventions have made it so, not because such practices are inherently anti-economic in their effects.

So I analyse anti-political economy along two lines: with one it is a matter of the techniques which nullify and displace political disagreement in the economy; with the other, those moves which suppress the identification of things as economic. With this point in mind, let us now turn more fully to the issue of migration cartography.

**Migration Cartography as Anti-Political Economy**

Migration cartography is certainly not new. There is a long tradition of charting the movement and settlement of peoples which spans the disciplines of history, geography, ethnology and demographics. For instance, it was in the late 1960s that Martin Gilbert, eminent British historian and official biographer of Churchill,
authored a series of historical atlases offering geospatialized narratives of British, American, Russian and Jewish history. The fact that the latter atlas (Gilbert 1969) ranges from a map which geo-graphs the Exodus from ‘Slavery to the Promised Land’ (Map 1), to one charting the ‘Return of Jews to Zion 1948-1964’ (Map 98), reveals that such apparently demographic exercises are quite adept at combining politics and anti-politics. The fact that two events of quite different historical and factual status can be represented using identical iconography, and located through the cartographic exercise upon a similar epistemological and geo-historical plane suggests at the very least that these older forms of migration cartography are certainly not always politically innocent.

But something is different and relatively new with regard to much of the migration cartography which interests me here. The social and political context in which migration maps are being produced and received seems to have changed. As research on ‘securitization’ has observed (Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2006), the political framing of migration issues, including the treatment of refugees, has moved its subject matter much more closely to the realm of security policy. This move has often been traced at the level of political rhetoric, exploring how politicians, media commentators and policymakers frame migration as a security issue, an existential threat to the cultural integrity and political sovereignty of the nation, etc. However, the study of migration maps points to and illustrates aspects of a more prosaic process of securitization, one that occurs at the level of everyday graphics, images and inscriptions. We can speculate that these representations are rarely politically decisive or influential on a singular basis. It would be hard to point to this or that map and argue that it changed public opinion about immigration in some decisive way. Instead, whatever effect they do have on public perceptions – the estimation of which is, of course, complex and beyond my scope here – we might assume to occur through processes of iteration. It is surely through their everyday presence in the margins of newspaper reports, as the background to TV news, or as a supplement to official reports that they help to produce a securitized political imagination of migration as well as the state.

**Popular Cartographies**

Let us return for a moment to the *Time* (2004) map, ‘Breaking Point’. Michel Foucher uses the term ‘geostrategy’ to refer to ‘concrete practices in places that are analysed as theatres of operation, actual and potential. It thus considers spatial, physical and human configurations in terms of war and defence’ (2001: 165). We can certainly discern powerful geostrategic themes structuring this map. The United States is cast as a territory enclosed by a border, which is marked in red. The map spatializes a series of border incidents, incidents which collectively attest to the vulnerability of a system of defence. But the map also generates a sense of drama and unease in other ways. For example, the map is subtended by three jagged graphs, displaying different aspects of the ‘volume’ of ‘illegal border crossings’ over time and place. Jonathan Inda (2006) has noted how narratives about ‘illegal immigration’ almost always represent it as something ‘growing’, and frequently ‘out of control’. Things always seem to be getting worse. In the case of ‘Breaking Point’ this impression of impending crisis is magnified through the juxtaposition of the red-lined border and the upward slope of the graph.
Other maps are even more explicit in the way that they locate migration processes within geopolitical space. In making this move, such maps largely suppress the economic connotations of migration. Foregrounding themes of territorial invasion, they negate the fact that much of the movement that is pejoratively designated as ‘illegal’ or ‘people smuggling’ could be considered as labour migration in a global capitalist economy (De Genova 2002).

Consider the simple little map entitled ‘routes through Europe’ which comes from the BBC’s online news website (Figure 2). It was originally embedded within a story exploring why the UK had become a major destination for asylum seekers (BBC 2001). The map depicts Europe as a space of national borders. But these borders are traversed by thick, arching lines which represent flows of asylum seekers converging on central and western Europe. These flows are shown to be heading to certain cities, such as Prague, Istanbul, and Belgrade, destinations that seem to be highlighted as nodal points within networks of irregular migration. Certainly the map speaks to immediate political concerns. It was published in the midst of a particular ‘crisis’ of asylum-seeking, one that condensed around the figure of ‘Sangatte’, a temporary refugee centre in northern France where migrants sheltered while waiting to cross the sea to England. But I think the map also works on other levels as well. Viewing its bold lines of movement it is hard not to detect echoes of those classical maps of warfare in which Europe features as a ‘theatre’ of military operations. But if such maps can forge historical connections evocative of games of war and statecraft, they can also establish resonances among other more contemporary phenomena, many of which exist as the targets of metaphorical wars. For instance, it is not uncommon to see formally similar maps diagramming the transnational flows of illicit goods, weapons and drugs. It is quite likely that the ‘security continuum’ and the ‘transfer of illegitimacy’ – processes which Bigo identifies as profoundly structuring the political and governmental field of migration – are

![Figure 2 Routes through Europe](image-url)
effected not just through the institutional and expert framing of things, but at the level of these little image-fragments.

Let us consider another map (Figure 3). This one utilizes data gathered by the Protection Project (2002) based at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. Its principal object is the depiction of ‘trafficking routes’ channelling vulnerable persons into the United States. There are two points I want to make here. First, while we should not lose sight of the fact that ‘trafficking’ is itself far from being a neutral concept (Aradau 2004), it is worth noting how this map could be accused of perpetrating an act of visual exaggeration. Its makers note at the bottom that to count as a route there needs to be ‘at least one documented case of trafficking of persons’. In other words, a route is not necessarily a well-worn pathway but nothing more than, at minimum, one documented case. Since the threshold for qualifying as a route is set so very low then it’s hardly surprising that the map manages to portray human trafficking as an overwhelming and dramatic phenomenon. In this case one could at least expect some differentiation in the depiction of the routes in terms of the incidence of trafficking.

My bigger point is not to note how such maps could be improved. Instead, it is to observe that this map, like the BBC one, conveys a powerful impression of western, developed countries.
as being confronted by a set of forces which penetrate their borders. Especially in the case of the trafficking map, one gets the sense of a process of besiegement, of territories surrounded on all sides. It is not difficult to see how the politics of re-bordering, whether understood as the fortification of frontiers or the trend towards greater surveillance of mobile populations, follows almost logically from such representations.

Crucial to understanding the power of these and countless similar image-fragments, and their anti-political economy effects, is their selectivity. Nowhere in their vicinity do we see the other forces which might give them some context, whether lines of capital investment and disinvestment, flows of ideas and images, circuits of tourism and trade, or relationships of military influence. In the absence of these other connections, migration appears as an ‘autonomous’ force (Sassen 1998) emanating from the troubled ‘borderlands’ of the global system, and massing in and around its privileged heartland. In the absence of any representation of the multiple ties that interconnect global zones of wealth and poverty – for example, cultural ties carried over from the age of formal colonialism – the wealthy regions appear as innocent bystanders, as victims of malign forces. The point is not that maps ought to be comprehensive. Mapping, like other forms of diagramming, is necessarily a selective practice. ‘A map is a show, a representation. What is shown is real, but that does not imply any completeness or entail any absence of choice in selection and representation’ (Black 1997: 11). The point is not to lament the selectivity of the map but to recognise that such selectivity is deployed strategically, in ways that seem to resonate with public cultures of insecurity.

I have argued that the kinds of maps discussed thus far can be considered elements of anti-political economy because of how they objectify migration as a security question, and depict it as a game that plays itself out in and through a space that is primarily geo-territorial in nature. In the maps we have encountered, the geographical and the territorial is foregrounded while the socioeconomic barely registers. Furthermore, each depicts migration rather unambiguously as a force that converges upon the borders and territories of the wealthy nations. It seems to embody a threat that emanates from outside the state. That said, I don’t want to suggest that these maps relentlessly convey an identical message. The field of migration cartography is far from homogeneous. Nor are its contents without certain forms of ambiguity. This much is evident when we turn to my final example of popular cartography: a map claiming to represent the journey of a single migrant, Marvin Hernandez, as he makes his way from San Salvador in El Salvador to Boston, Massachusetts.

Published in connection with a three part series in the online version of the Arizona Daily Star entitled ‘Marvin’s Journey: One Migrant’s Tale’ (Ibarra and Scott 2000), there are several things that are somewhat distinctive about this map (Figure 4). First, there is the fact that we have here an instance where ‘illegal immigration’ is being represented at the level of the biographical. If previous maps showed migration as a transgressive practice of border crossing, here the level of detail is raised. The map documents events like the crossing of a river using a rope suspension bridge near a small Mexican village, and a three day trek across the desert to get to Bisbee, Arizona. In this way ‘illegal immigration’ starts to resemble a Homeric odyssey as the map geo-graphs the series of adventures and perils which Marvin encounters in the course of his journey. Far from demonizing the migrant – as the literature on securitization often presumes – this map seems to discern something faintly heroic in his quest.
Second, it is notable that the dangerous journey culminates with Marvin finding paid employment on the East coast. Three days after receiving fake resident alien social security cards, we are told, Marvin begins working in a Boston factory. Unlike some of the other maps, then, we do see here the recognition that migratory movements are bound up with the search, and the demand for paid employment – in this case within US manufacturing. That said, it is also notable that if the economy is accorded a place within this representation, it is one that is tightly circumscribed.

Figure 4
Source: Ibarra et al. (2000). Reproduced with kind permission, the Arizona Daily Star

The economic is present, not as a realm of forces and processes of transnational trade, investment and communication, but only as an incident: the taking of illegal employment. Inasmuch as a map like this offers a kind of explanation of ‘illegal immigration’, the economic registers as just one moment amidst a world populated by smugglers, border patrols, corrupt police, and inhospitable terrains. In other words, the economic is not effaced but is de-privileged: it registers as only one amongst many salient factors.
The final point I want to make here is somewhat more speculative. In discussing *Time* (2004) magazine’s map of the US-Mexico border we noted how it locates unauthorized migration within a topographical space. Migratory movements were superimposed upon a map which was largely devoid of political features such as cities but instead much closer to being a physical geography. Much the same can be said of this depiction of Marvin’s journey. Note, for instance, how the red line tracing Marvin’s movements traverses mountains and deserts until it reaches Phoenix. This could perhaps be read as a move which naturalises the territory of the state by embedding it in the landscape. But I think that it might be interpreted in a somewhat different manner, one that emphasizes the ambiguity of representation. Could we not read these political topographies of migration as speaking to the fact that for millions of people, migration has once again become an intensely embodied, strenuously physical activity – an affair conducted on foot, a dangerous passage negotiated across deserts and mountains, a perilous journey navigated over tempestuous waters? Could it be that these maps speak to ways in which the act of migrating once again requires the poor of the world to confront elemental forces, to negotiate the very contours of the earth? There was once a time when a state’s delimitation of its territory was grounded in appeals to the idea of certain natural frontiers – a river, a mountain range, etc. (Pounds 1951). Such ideas have long since been abandoned. However, inasmuch as contemporary migrations like the one documented here involve a confrontation not just with the policing and security agencies of the state but with the terrain of the earth, perhaps there is a sense in which we are once more in the presence of the natural frontier.

**Official Cartographies**

In my prior discussion I suggested that there are at least two possible interpretations of anti-political economy. The first is about translating political controversies into technical objectives that might be pursued by relatively de-dramatized economic and other means. The second is the move of non-identification, wherein economic moments and identities are
suppressed by other discourses and systems of meaning. The maps I have discussed thus far tend towards this second position. At this point I want to consider one map that is much closer to this first position. That is, I want to consider the case of a map that appears to have a higher programmatic and governmental content, and a greater degree of instrumentality than the maps which typically appear in mass communication contexts.

Titled ‘MTM Map on Mediterranean and African Irregular Migration Routes’ (Figure 5), the map in question comes from a project called the Mediterranean Transit Migration (MTM) Dialogue. The main architect of this project is the Vienna-based International Centre for Migration Policy and Development (ICMPD), but its partners include Europol and the EU’s special agency for frontier controls, Frontex. ICMPD has been described as a ‘think tank and an influential consultancy centre for the EU Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs’ (see entry for ICMPD at http://www.transitmigration.org/migmap/home_map1.html). A part of its field of operations has involved the reinforcement of the external frontiers of Eastern Europe in conjunction with that regions gradual assimilation into the EU. In many ways, MTM is a project of immigration policy statecraft. It is seeking to enlist North African governments (dubbed ‘Arab Partner States’), and other actors geopolitically coded as ‘countries of transit’ and ‘origin’, in Europe’s ongoing campaign to police unruly migration flows – or what the EU in its more adversarial moments designates as its ‘combat with illegal immigration’.

ICMPD’s map can be fruitfully compared with some of the other maps we have discussed thus far. It is interesting in several respects. First, notice how Europe, represented as a largely undifferentiated blue mass, now recedes into the background. The focus has shifted somewhat from the space of destination, and even from the trans-European routeways identified in the BBC map, to Africa and to the Near and Middle East, to the in-between regions of transit. More and more, it seems, the routeway, and its subjective correlate, the migrant’s journey (Figure 4), as much as the border, becomes an object of knowledge in its own right.

Second, and following from this, the map presents the viewer with something we might call an analytics of the route. This was largely absent from the Protection Project’s map (Figure 3). Here we encounter multiple kinds of line, allowing for the differentiation of media of movement (land, sea, air), and scales of movement (major, minor).

Third, where previously there were curved lines offering the impression of determined flows of population, here we are presented with something which appears more finely calibrated, diagrammatic and technical. The lines are straighter than before and distributed by a plethora of towns and cities. Movement plays itself out across a space of nodal places. The ensemble of the routes and the nodes comprises a network. If the project of European integration has often imagined itself positively in terms of a space of networks (Barry 1996), here we find one instance where a less benign face of the network appears, and where Europe imagines its limits rather than its extension, in terms of the network.

In what ways might this attempt to generate a scientific analysis of migration routes serve as an element within the technicalization of migration politics? Does this anti-political move, which displaces a whole series of possible political questions about the distribution of justice, citizenship and wealth under global conditions, go hand in hand with the attempt to co-opt the
‘Arab Partner States’ designated and colour-coded by the map, into international regimes of ‘migration management’?

It is certainly important to challenge the political detachment which is claimed for maps like this one, and the larger projects of migration management to which they belong (cf. Düvell 2006). However, there is another dimension of mapping that I want to explore in this instance. Here a comparison with the cartography of colonialism is instructive for it speaks to the map as an ethical technology, concerned as much with establishing the right and fitness of certain authorities to govern distant peoples and places, as it is with the precise nature or geographical location of those persons and places. Mapping is, in this sense, about making ethical as well as territorial claims. Joyce has put this nicely in regard to official cartography’s aspiration to construct British India as an object of rule. It illustrates that ‘the practice and reception of instruments of governance may sometimes be of secondary importance: what seems to have mattered here…was the creation of the illusion of a rational, and therefore governable, space, that of a mapped “India”’ (Joyce 2005: 37).

In the case of ICMPD and other international agencies, we are not of course dealing with the aspiration to control territories or build empires but a somewhat more modest aim: to rationalize the management of migratory processes. But of this map in particular I think we can speak of two kinds of ambition at work. One is, as with the mapping of India, a case of justifying one’s own fitness to govern. It is perhaps about being perceived as a serious and reputable agency within the crowded field of migration and security policy. Another ambition is more specific to the form and content of the map. Note the way in which it seems to resemble the plan of a transportation system, or a transit map. Perhaps, then, it also expresses the political dream that the unruliness and ‘turbulence’ (Papastergiadis 2000) of contemporary migration really could be channelled into rational, ordered pathways.

Counter-Mapping

If migration mapping deserves to be taken more seriously and regarded as an irreducible element within contemporary politicizations and depoliticizations of migration, this is not just because popular media utilize these maps in their encounter with the complexity of migration. Nor is it because certain experts and agencies like ICMPD and IOM tasked with the work of ‘managing’ migration have found in the map both a means to rationalize their interventions, and affirm their status as experts in the competitive institutional field of migration security. Migration mapping is a lively phenomenon today not just because it offers something valuable to policy officials and mainstream media. It is also because migration cartography has been fashioned as an instrument of protest, a polemical intervention, and even a heterotopian medium for a range of actors outside the space of public policy and its institutions. Developing in parallel with official cartographies of migration, various tactical cartographers, critical geographers, self-styled hacktivists, and visual artists have improvised a practice of migration counter-mapping – what one video artist and theorist calls ‘writing counter-geography’ (Biemann 2003; see also An Architektur 2003; MigMap n.d.; Raley 2008). If the restless desires and energies associated with capitalism are constantly provoking new spaces and experiences which sometimes defy existing categories, it is this challenge of making such processes representable and intelligible which this alternative cartography seems to be taking up.
This visualistic counter-geography of migration deserves to be the subject of study in its own right. It also needs to be seen in light of a wider turn within political activism and critical thought whereby mapping has become a critical practice for a range of movements and counter-publics (Crampton 2001; Mogel and Bhagat 2008). Lacking the space to do more than gesture towards such a project here I shall confine myself to the discussion of one map (Figure 6).

Produced by the Spain-based collective Hackitectura, the English version of its title is ‘Cartography of the Straits of Gibraltar: Borders and Migrations’. It is just one of a sizeable family of maps this project has made concerning the migration politics of the Straits of Gibraltar. The choice of this site is, of course, far from incidental. The Straits has long been considered a meeting point as much as a frontier between Europe and Africa. But like the US/Mexico border, this space has more recently become a frontline in the struggle to tame new processes of global migration.

Hackitectura’s maps attempt to reference the multiple processes, regimes and agendas which co-exist, converge and clash at the space of the Straits – questions of work, territory, citizenship, technology, frontier controls, mobility, and much else. The fact that the map positions this particular geographical locale at its very centre,

and the fact that all manner of networks, flows and processes are represented as traversing this symbolic frontier between Europe and Africa, suggests that the map is not interested in reproducing the old political lines of nations and continents. Instead, it strives to chart the emergence of strange new territories that confound these lines. For these map-makers, the Straits are an experimental encounter, a kind of ‘laboratory-territory of the contemporary world’ (Fadaiat 2005: 169). This ambition to map discordant and heterogeneous processes and spaces, to explore
their combination, immediately marks it out from official cartographies which, as we have seen, are distinguished by the fact they reproduce the lines which organise and partition social knowledge about migration – a point I shall return to shortly.

There is so much going on in Hackitectura’s maps that it is difficult to know where to start. Certainly we might mention how this map operates on one level as a work of parody. Notice how it flips cartographic convention on its head, placing North Africa ‘above’ and Europe ‘below’. As such, and as I noted above, it might prompt us to consider how certain cultural assumptions about the good and the bad might be embedded in conventional mapping practices. Note also how it parodies the forceful lines which migration maps use to represent flows of population. In Hackitectura’s version, these big vectors are replaced by a jumble of squiggly little arrows drawn in an almost childlike hand. Some of the lines are purposeful, others hesitate, turn back, or, quite ominously, even terminate in the sea. Each little line

could be a biography in its own right. Or note how, on closer inspection, this map is written over other maps, and English terms inscribed over Spanish. Here we encounter the map as palimpsest. Whereas official mapping insists that the map unfold across a blank space, these maps just add layer upon layer. Whereas official mapping may often erase other histories and geographies, Hackitectura brings the violence of mapping to the surface. There is no pretence to objectivity here, just as there is no suggestion that the maps are somehow uncontaminated by previous knowledges and uses. Instead, mapping is represented as a site of struggle in its own right, a struggle to dominate a space of authoritative representation. Hackitectura practices a ‘living cartography’ (Fadaiat 2005: 169) which insists upon its own provisionality.

Much more could be said about the parodic and subversive character of this map. But here I shall confine my comments to its relevance to the theme of anti-political economy. Here we can start by noting the extremely mixed, composite quality of the map. If it is a palimpsest it also resembles a work of bricolage. It harbours no aspiration towards systematicity or a uniformity of style that is so essential to the official map’s credibility. Instead, heterogeneous elements, jagged forms and fragments are juxtaposed. There are advertisements for products, photographs showing uniformed officials (perhaps coast guards or police), posters for political demonstrations. Other photographs document additional aspects of this border complex that have no place within official cartography. They show a brown-skinned hand which works a sewing machine; a long line of traffic congested at a checkpoint; grainy night-time surveillance footage of border-crossers; and striking workers. Vivid symbols identify special sites of interest, but these are not of a tourist nature. The euro sign identifies strategic locales in the growing economy of the borderlands, while a mini-version of the map of the Straits – the map within the map – signifies processes of internal and external frontier-ization. The overall effect is a bit like a school project where a group of students are asked to make a display exploring a particular topic. Each brings a clipping from home and pastes it onto the board, generating a unique play of interpretation.

But in what ways could this map be said to challenge the anti-political economy of migration? One might answer this question by pointing to the very visible presence of economic processes and identities in the map. For instance, it depicts networks which gesture towards the connection between the licit and the illicit, and the co-dependence of local, global, European and ‘underground’ economies. So while it displays the processes of securitization and rebordering at work in the region, it refuses to subsume the economic within the geopolitical – the move which, as we have seen, conventional maps do make. As we saw, Barry insists that the anti-political move to render a space of disagreement into technical, measurable, and administrable forms is
itself always susceptible to politicisation, often in new and unpredictable ways. Hence, we might observe something similar here: that Hackitectura politicises the anti-political regime of migration mapping by its insistence on the economic dimension and neoliberal capitalist uses of ‘illegal immigration’.

But I think such an interpretation, while valid in many respects, still misses something crucial. The key thing here is not merely the foregrounding of economic processes. For there is nothing inherently critical in pointing out that ‘illegal immigration’ is animated by market forces. Certainly this point is sometimes made as a response to anti-immigrantist claims. For instance, demands for migrants’ rights and social justice often refute the popular image of the migrant as scrounger by pointing to the value, the ‘invisible’ economic contribution which illegal labour makes to a country’s GDP. But just as often, the act of unauthorized migration is criticised on economic grounds – for instance, there is the often-heard complaint that migrants ‘steal’ jobs from ‘native’ workers, or depress the level of wages in the labour market. Clearly economically framed discussions can cut both ways.

If Hackitectura engages in a genuinely critical act, it is not merely by mobilizing the economic and insisting this is a political-economic as well as, or rather than, a security issue. It is not a matter of presenting one scientific discourse as essentially more truthful than another. For that move fails to problematize the organisation of knowledge itself. If these kinds of map open up a critical space, it is in a different way: by exposing and at the same time transgressing the purification processes (Latour 1993) which enable discourse about ‘illegal immigration’ to function. Hackitectura seeks to represent something that finds no place in either the purified space of the geopolitical maps of trafficking, nor in economic (even certain political-economic) accounts of migration. A hodge-podge of pictures, graphics, symbols; the recycling and reuse of old maps to make something new; the juxtaposition of seemingly discordant fragments of technology, bodies, politics, machines and territory: this seems to point to an understanding of migration in terms of the assemblage – ‘an ensemble of heterogeneous elements in contingent and provisional interrelationships’ (Ong 2005: 259). This assemblage cannot be represented if one adheres to the conventions of the social sciences. For the organisation of the social sciences, the lines which divide the economic from the geographical, from the political, and so on, are already internal to it.

Why is this significant? What political effects does it accomplish? Think back to the BBC and Protection Project maps. These typically represent illegal migration in terms of an interaction between passive and active entities. Western states are passive actors whose sovereign territory is violated by the intrusion of the active – the malicious external forces. The line always runs from a distant, outside place, through zones of transit, into the heart of the national territory. Under this view, and in much the same way that we have Ministries of Defence and not Ministries of Attack, western states never initiate, they only respond to a prior ‘incursion’. Migration policy, border control – these are cast as re-actions to a prior transgression.

But once we can see things in terms of an assemblage, a somewhat different picture is possible. There are two things to be said in this respect. First, the starting point is not two static and objective entities – be these the states of Spain and Morocco or the continents of Europe and Africa – existing in an external
relationship with one another. Hackitectura take Deleuze and Guattari at their word because their performative practice starts ‘in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo,’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 25). Their map reveals some of the many ways in which Europe and Africa fold into one another (Balibar 2004). There is no beginning or end, only the middle. For instance, take the case of border controls. These are totally invisible in many of the popular and official maps. Hence people smuggling appears in official representations only as a violent act perpetrated on victim-migrants and the states of destination (victim-states?). Yet smuggling only happens, it can only exist and thrive as an illicit form of ‘travel agency’ (Sharma 2003), because the thickening of borders has made it one of the only ways that refugees, for instance, can exercise the internationally-sanctioned right of all politically-threatened human beings to seek asylum. This is why it is so important that Hackitectura’s assemblage represents migration and practices of border control, surveillance, investment and work as existing on the same plane, within the same space.

Second, by mapping from the point of view of the assemblage, Hackitectura says something important about contemporary capitalism and the character of work. Standard economic understandings of migration very much resemble the standard economic accounts of other things. There are forces of supply and demand, push and pull, incentives and disincentives. The global market is imagined as a ‘hydraulic’ system pushing and pulling its subjects around (Mezzadra 2004). But as David Harvey has recently reminded us, the textbook account of the economy is only one face of capitalist accumulation. Indeed, it is the benign and ‘rational’ face. There is another face which consists of all the ‘predatory practices’ which, far from belonging to a ‘primitive’ or ‘original’ stage of capitalism – as many Marxist accounts assumed – have a ‘continuous role’ and ‘persistence…within the long historical geography of capitalist accumulation’ (Harvey 2004: 74). These predatory practices have been integral to the vitality of capitalism. They include the forcible appropriation of common land, slavery, as well as practices whose pedigree is more recent, such as biopiracy. But while Harvey doesn’t mention it, a strong argument could be made that such a list should also include the political production of the illegal immigrant as a source of unfree and exposed labour (De Genova 2002; Moulier Boutang 1998). Locating its representation of migrant work within an assemblage comprising systems of surveillance, military and police personnel, free enterprise zones, and smuggling networks, Hackitectura unsettles the pure view of the economy, and reveals a regime of work shot through with relations of violence and force.

There is one final point to make. While an assemblage might be likened to a machine because of the interaction of its parts, and their translation of energy into certain outputs, it has none of the fixed attributes which we typically associate with the more conventional conception of machinery. Assemblages are provisional and contingent arrangements. The connections between their parts are not guaranteed. Bits are prone to flying off at unforeseeable moments and at unpredictable tangents. There is one symbol on the map that I have not yet mentioned. It seems to be the figure of Marianne. Of course, this figure first appeared at the time of the French Revolution as a symbol of liberty and citizenship. Yet Marianne was and remains a much-contested symbol. Revolutionaries had depicted her wearing a Phrygian cap, a cap that had been worn by freed slaves in Greece and Rome, but also by Mediterranean seamen and convicts in the galleys. But in many representations of Marianne, such as busts in many town halls, the cap was deemed to be too seditious and replaced with a crown. The revolutionary force of Marianne was neutralized, her image sanitized and made more compatible with less democratic forms of rule. Marianne
would thus seem to be a particularly suitable image to attach to this assemblage – a sign of potential future citizenships, but also citizenships without assurances.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter has argued that the project of developing a more culturally attuned and informed version of political economy is a timely and important one. But it has suggested that any discussion of the intersection of politics with cultural and economic phenomena should pay attention to those occasions when it is not so much the constitution of the economic which is at stake, but its suppression or displacement. The chapter has suggested the notion of anti-political economy as a useful starting point for investigations which examine the delimitation of the economic.

The argument has been illustrated by reference to the case of migration cartography. A secondary argument of the paper is that these migration maps deserve to be an object of critical analysis in their own right, and that such analysis can enrich ongoing work on the visualization, securitization, and geopoliticization of migration. It transpires that it would be inaccurate to describe migration cartography unequivocally as a practice of anti-political economy. In many cases it is, but not always. For migration mapping is, in fact, not adequately described as a singular instrument of power or ideology but more accurately a heterogeneous field comprising multiple political agendas, representations, interests and possibilities. Indeed, so rich and insightful are certain forms of migration counter-mapping that they can serve not just as case studies for scholarly analysis in political economy or migration and security studies, but as materials that might aid in the development of new and better concepts.

In a recent study oriented towards theorizing what he calls ‘the turbulence of migration’, Papastergiadis argues that contemporary forms of migration have become so complex and diverse that ‘it is now almost impossible to map movement with a series of arrows, on a flat two-dimensional representation of the world’ (Papastergiadis 2000: 24). If this is indeed the case, then we are faced with something of a conundrum. Why is it that migration mapping – which in many cases does indeed reduce migration to a series of arrows on a two-dimensional plane – should become a common representational practice just at a time when it should be in many ways outmoded? In showing that migration mapping can operate in multiple registers – official, popular, radical – and can find various political and anti-political applications, this chapter on the cartography of illegal immigration has offered one possible answer to this puzzle.

Notes

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Certainly, if we look beyond the social sciences narrowly conceived, we do find a sustained engagement with questions concerning the visual representation and construction of human migration. Video artists, film-makers, curators, cultural and urban theorists are amongst those who are currently exploring the visual (and aural) field of migration. See, for example, Projekt Migration, a major initiative funded by Germany’s Federal Culture Foundation, which included seminars and an exhibition in Cologne in 2005, and generated the impressive catalogue, Projekt Migration (Cologne: DuMont Verlag, 2005). That said, even amongst cultural and performative work, there has been little engagement with questions of mapping. One exception is the video work of Ursula Biemann. For instance, in Contained Mobility (Biemann 2004) she uses cartographic idioms to examine political controversies about human migration, subtly conveying how there is an ongoing geo-strategic re-coding of ports and other spaces of everyday commerce. More recently, see the excellent website MigMap, and its powerful ‘virtual cartography of European migration policies’ (www.transitmigration.org/migmap/home_map1.html; accessed September 18, 2008). Critical here is the fact that it is not migrants and population flows but the migration, security, humanitarian and policing agencies and their expert discourses that are located at the centre of the mapping exercise.

Elsewhere I have suggested the name of domopolitics for the move that seeks to legitimate certain forms of migration policy in the name of the state as ‘home’ (Walters 2004). Domopolitics seems particularly useful for thinking about cases where the management of the state and the defense of society is not rationalized in explicitly bio-racial terms or even within a language of (national) culture, but instead through allusions to house-breaking and home invasion. In these circumstances the idea of border control comes to resemble a home alarm system or firewall (Walters 2006).

For example, see many of the excellent essays collected in Ong and Collier (2005).

A fuller discussion of this map would need to consider it in terms of a genealogy of migration governance. With certain exceptions (Inda 2006; Ngai 2004) this project remains undeveloped. One aspect of such a genealogy would surely be an account of the contingently formed and shifting objects and territories of migration governance. If so, then interventions such as ICMPD’s will perhaps appear in connection with the birth of something new – a dispositif formed around the time, space, economy and culture of transit.

### Bibliography


