Europe’s Borders

It sometimes seems that borders are everywhere in Europe today. Certainly there is an irony here. Not so long ago many commentators were eagerly anticipating a 'borderless' Europe, a unified space open to the movement of people, goods and finance. Yet while the completion of the EU’s Single Market project offered institutional confirmation of at least certain powerful debordering tendencies, elsewhere borders, both old and new, have returned to the political scene. For instance, by the end of the 1990s the creation of new states in Central and Eastern Europe had added 8,000 miles of new frontiers to Europe's political map (Foucher, 1998: 235). Montenegro's recent separation from Serbia is only the latest political event to augment this figure. Meanwhile, the politicization and securitization of migration has given rise to the border as 'spectacle' (De Genova, 2002): media coverage relays dramatic images of decrepit boats unloading 'asylum-seekers' (consider how the very term marks its subjects with suspicion) onto the coasts of Europe's Mediterranean islands and its mainland. Politicians only deepen this obsession with borders when they promise 'tougher' controls as a 'solution' to this 'immigration crisis'. Relatedly, and at the same time that it proceeds with schemes to promote cross-border cooperation to mitigate the legacy of Europe's historical division into myriad nation states, the EU has become the setting for new kinds of border, most notably its moving 'external frontier'. The capacity for effective border control now sits alongside democratic reform and economic stability as a governmental prerequisite for admission into the EU’s privileged circle of states. And as the EU moves 'outwards' no discussion of its future composition can take place, it seems, without lengthy and sometimes agonizing debate concerning the present and future 'frontiers' of Europe – ‘Where does Europe end?’ Meanwhile, academic discourse is rife with borders too. Not only have borders become a central motif for disciplines (once) as different as international relations and cultural studies; there is also the fact that borders and frontiers have become popular metaphors in discussions of identity, power, community and their exclusions. Where once inequality and social struggle was imagined in vertical, sometimes pyramidal shapes (Maier, 2002), today a more horizontal imagination is at work: circles and boundaries demarcate the inside and the out, the included and the excluded. Borders also feature prominently within the political imagination of contestation. Networks as different as Médecins sans Frontières

and Noborder reveal how political actors have come to rethink themselves in, across and sometimes against a space of borders. In many ways, borders have become a meta-concept:
all manner of social issues now find expression and connection in a language of boundaries, margins and frontiers.

However voluble and ubiquitous, it is important to stress that this veritable explosion of border talk is in many respects quite recent. It is worth recalling that for much of the post-WWII period, the question of borders was relatively marginal within political analysis. The study of borders certainly had a place within the academy but one that was largely confined to certain specialist subfields like political geography and international law. Perhaps it was a reflection of the extended period of territorial stability which Europe experienced in the post-WWII period (M. Anderson, 1998: 1), the aspatiality of the social sciences at this time (Soja, 1989), or the fact that as a form of knowledge geopolitics was discredited in many countries by virtue of its association with aggressive nationalism and war (Lacoste, 2001: 132–5). Whatever the specific reasons, the figure of the border had little of the salience it enjoys today.

It is important to acknowledge the relative novelty of border talk in order to avoid a position that takes the contemporary prominence of borders for granted. By this I mean a perspective that posits borders as an essential feature of political order, a necessary feature of state sovereignty, and an obvious topic for any self-respecting volume on European studies. Certainly borders need to be more fully studied and theorized because of the multiple and complex functions they perform within contemporary societies. Certainly bordering offers a useful motif to enrich our understanding of political ordering (van Houtum et al., 2005). At the same time, it is best to approach the topic of borders and bordering in a way that acknowledges the contingency of the present moment. If border talk is everywhere, then it becomes incumbent upon those contributing to such discussions to account for the topicality of borders. However obvious it may seem today, there is perhaps nothing inevitable about our current obsession with borders.

With this point in mind, this chapter surveys some of the main trends and important developments in scholarship relating to Europe's borders. The first section starts from the proposition that we cannot make sense of borders and bordering in Europe without also addressing certain questions about the changing form of political space. Political space is admittedly a somewhat ambiguous concept that invites multiple, potentially contradictory interpretations. However, it is also a useful term enabling us to plot transformations in such key practices as territoriality, political identity and sovereignty. Furthermore, the idea of political space does not commit us in advance to any propositions about the ontology of political order in Europe. Instead, it allows us to work with the understanding that multiple ordering and organizing projects are pertinent and co-exist – the international, the transnational, the network, and so on (Agnew, 1999; Jönsson et al., 2000). Since each implies a different conception of borders, the meaning of borders today becomes quite complex indeed.

A second section examines Europe's borders in relation to the concrete issue of migration. This is apt given that it allows for a more grounded engagement with some of the more abstract questions raised in the discussion of political space. But it is also valid given that the issue of migration has become so central to border talk and border spectacles.

The topic of 'Europe's borders' necessarily raises two questions that should be clarified from the outset. First, there is the matter of which borders. We have already noted the current popularity of borders as a metaphor. For practical reasons I shall confine my discussion largely to political, as opposed to, say, social or psychological borders. While a broader, more sociologically informed definition of territory and borders might encompass the space of the
home, the neighbourhood, or the terrain of social relations (the borders of class, etc.), I will be limiting my discussion to

the borders of states and other political entities and spaces. And while a large literature has examined the subjective, everyday experience of borders (Meinhof, 2002) for the most part I am interested in borders inasmuch as they are institutionalized within regimes of power and governance.

The other preliminary question concerns the meaning of Europe itself. In the wake of important interventions by postmodern geographers, postcolonial critics, historians of ideas and others, the idea that Europe is a stable referent, a geography, civilization or people capable of objectively founding a politics or delimiting a space has been profoundly unsettled (Chakrabarty, 2000; Crowley, 2003; Delanty, 1995; Diez, 1999; Pagden, 2002). If Europe is, in a sense, 'unfamiliar territory' (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 120), and 'not where it is supposed to be' (R. Walker, 2000), then we cannot point to a place, state or continent called Europe which readily reveals its borders, edges or divisions to an impartial observer. On the contrary, I take the position that debates about the frontiers of Europe are unavoidably political interventions which interject elements of fixture into the fluid and ambiguous space that is Europe. A dynamic and co-constitutive relationship exists between Europe and its borders; whatever their pretensions, analyses of Europe's borders ultimately participate in discursive and political games of European constitution.

**Borders and Political Space**

A host of developments have combined in recent decades to unsettle what we understand as Europe's borders. Together they can be read as prompting not just a redrawing of borders but a challenge to the modern constitution of political space itself. Any list of such developments would surely include but not confine itself to the following events and transformations: the end of the Cold War and the search for a new security framework at a time when the apparent proliferation of 'non-traditional' and even 'deterritorialized' threats (Ó Tuathail, 1999) makes the meaning of security uncertain; fluid new forms, scales and systems of capitalist accumulation which simultaneously de-privilege the old Fordist spaces of national economy while multiplying and deepening local and transnational economic spaces (Jessop, 1999); the intensification of translocal identities and transnational communities that has arisen from new patterns of migration and settlement and new modes of communication; the rise of regional identities which often pit subnational aspirations for autonomy against centralized political regimes and their cultures. Finally, there has been the political, economic and institutional project of European integration itself. Responding to, catalysing and in some cases regulating the kinds of processes just mentioned, the institutional thickening, and functional and geographical extension of the EU has contributed in powerful ways to unsettle the conventional political map of Europe.

In its encounter with such transformations, much scholarship on the subject of borders and Europe has come to recognize the limitations of state-centric theories, and reject the move which imagines zero-sum relationships between markets and states, globalization and sovereignty, territoriality and virtuality. Recent scholarship has in different ways started with the proposition that an adequate account of borders is not possible without confronting what Agnew (1994) has pithily termed the 'territorial trap'. Accordingly, it has undertaken the difficult task of theorizing configurations of sovereignty, territory and governance that diverge from the deeply
ingrained pattern of the modern state system. While this enterprise has taken a number of promising directions, for the purposes of this chapter there are three themes I intend to emphasize: territoriality, sovereignty, and political imagination.

**Territoriality**

The first line of research orbits the theme of territoriality, and more specifically, the constitution of modern territoriality. A significant body of work has examined different ways in which the territorial state is far from timeless, but in fact the product of institutional dynamics, social constructions, political and geopolitical struggles, and economic forces (Biersteker and Weber, 1996; Spruyt, 1994; Tilly, 1992). By historicizing the political space of the modern state (for instance, typifying it as 'Westphalian' or 'Weberian'), such research has opened a space in which to think more critically and imaginatively about current reconfigurations of power, politics, borders and territory in Europe. A milestone in this respect was Ruggie's hypothesis that with its 'extraterritorial' common market and its 'multiperspectival polity', the EC/EU marks nothing less than the most advanced instance of a wider process in which modern territoriality was becoming 'unbundled' (Ruggie, 1993).

Subsequent research has explored the consequences of this unbundling process for the meaning, location and identity of Europe's borders (J. Anderson, 1996; Hassner, 2002; Maier, 2002). Considerable attention has focused on patterns of cross-border regionalism and region-building (J. Anderson et al., 2003; Kramsch and Hooper, 2004; Perkmann and Sum, 2002). The emergence of subnational and cross-border regions, a process that the EU has sought to instrumentalize as a technology of European integration (for instance, through programmes like INTERREG), is interesting for many reasons. Not the least of these is the pluralization of European space and identity which it effects. But crossborder regionalism also offers a nice illustration of what Diez has called the 'paradoxes of Europe's borders'. 'A basic paradox of European integration', he argues, 'is that the decreasing importance of borders is based on the recognition of those very borders' (Diez, 2006: 237). Cross-border regions and their governmental institutions generate new regional borders, albeit lines that are less dramatic and totalizing than state borders. But in the process of smoothing the historical scars left by the old borders they turn these borders into objects of policy-making in their own right, changing them from lines into 'two-dimensional space' (Christiansen and Joergensen, 2000: 63).

As the case of regions certainly reveals, European integration has been viewed as a dynamic and contradictory process, one that encourages new patterns of debordering and rebordering and among and across its member states. But when attention turns to the EU itself, understood as an emergent, albeit uncertain polity in its own right, other transformations of borders become apparent. It is here that themes of unbundling and postmodernization have been most emphasized. Typically it is argued that modern political space fostered a certain symmetry of governance and geographical area. Functions of economic regulation, taxation, law, policing, social policy and defence were designed to coincide across the same geographical space. The EU is sometimes regarded as a 'postmodern' polity possessing 'fuzzy borders' precisely because this coincidence of governmental and functional space no longer obtains (M. Anderson and Bigo, 2003; Christiansen and Joergensen, 2000). Membership of the EMU is different from Schengenland which is different from Social Europe. They overlap but each has its own borders. This pattern of course owes much to the pragmatic calculations of states choosing to 'opt' in and
out of different areas rather than any grand design. Whatever its genesis, it has been formalized with the legal and conceptual recognition of 'flexibility' as an ethos for the future 'integration' of Europe.

This fuzziness of the Europe's borders only becomes more pronounced once we note that the EU may be the most widely recognized agency to speak in the name of Europe, but it is of course not the only one. Arguing that political institutions offer a more workable and productive way to define 'Europe' than either culture or geography, Wallace (2002) reminds us of the role that organizations like NATO and the Council of Europe have also played in configuring European space. Since each embodies a different idea of Europe, both in terms of geographical scope and identity, then one can say that the boundaries of political Europe are particularly ambiguous.

These kinds of historically informed studies of territoriality have another purpose besides exploring patterns of postmodernization. They have also brought to light other forms of borders and proto-borders that have been eclipsed or marginalized by the idea of the modern state system. By revealing the diverse forms of bordering historically practised by political communities — such spaces as the 'limes' (Rufin, 2001) and the pioneer frontier (M. Anderson, 1996: 4) — these studies have broadened our conceptual repertoire for thinking about new forms of borders. Take the example of the march, an archaic name that in many ways pertains to a premodern territoriality in which states and peoples were not divided by strict lines. The march has been described as 'a neutral strip or belt of severance' (Curzon, 1908), or a frontier 'region' rather than a line (M. Anderson, 1996: 9). But the march could also function not just as barrier but a space of interaction. Ellis has described the Anglo-Gaelic and Anglo-Welsh marches as regions where 'English settlements were often interspersed with native areas, so creating multiple, localized frontiers which were fragmented and fluid, rather than consolidated blocs. Both were zones of interaction and assimilation between peoples of very different cultures' (Ellis, 1995: 683).

Foucher has suggested that, in the period following the Cold War, we see a return of the march in Central Europe. Reminding us that the precise meaning of the word 'Ukraine' is 'march' or 'border area', he observes that 'from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, and perhaps part of the shores of the Adriatic Sea, a kind of 'Middle Europe' … an in-between Europe is reviving' (Foucher, 1998: 236).

Since the march can be both a space of interaction and a buffer zone, this concept seems particularly appropriate to the territory designated as the 'Central and Eastern European Countries' (CEEC). A number of studies suggest that EU migration and security policies maintain a complex and contradictory relationship with CEEC (Collinson, 1996; Grabbe, 2000; Lavenex and Uçarer, 2003). On the one hand, a combination of EU membership and partnership agreements has brought this space firmly within the political–economic orbit of the EU. On the other, the terms of enlargement have seen the region accorded the status of a buffer zone, a space which is to insulate the heartland of the EU from what many strategists regard as the turbulent, chaotic spaces of the former Soviet Empire to the east, and more generally global movements of refugees, economic migrants and other mobile 'threats'. Nothing better illustrates this than the patchwork of 'readmission' and 'safe third country' agreements now in place which aim at orchestrating transnational 'flows of expulsion' from the EU area (Rigo, quoted in Mezzadra and Neilson, 2003).
Historical sociologies of the rise of modern territoriality, and its (postmodern) transformation, have certainly deepened our understanding of the meaning and functions of Europe's borders. But they are not without their own shortcomings. I shall briefly make two points in this regard. First, there is often a progressive historiography and sometimes a teleology embedded in the modern/postmodern narrative. Frequently the modern comes to stand for neatness, order and symmetry while the postmodern pole represents fluidity, complexity, diversity, heterogeneity and in certain cases deterritorialization. One problem here is that such a narrative produces (and, it could be argued, requires) an overly simplistic and even mythical view of the modern state. It is worth emphasizing that modern states were not as neatly bounded as the idea of the 'territorial state' suggests. Past as well as present societies had their own forms of 'transnationalism' (Mann, 1993; Paasi, 2005: 25). After all, nearly all the states which first comprised the European Economic Community were, to differing extents, former imperial metropoles. Each state had its national borders, but was simultaneously located within wider, imperial spaces of trade, migration, affiliation and antagonism. Consider, for instance, the way in which migration was relatively unrestricted from the Commonwealth and (former) colonies to Britain until the 1960s, or that it was not until 1981 that Britain adopted a fully national rather than imperial conception of citizenship (Layton-Henry, 2004). Or consider how elementary school textbooks and atlases of the 1950s represented the space of the modern Netherlands, employing colour schemes and ingenious lines to effect a seamless and seemingly natural continuity between the provinces of the Netherlands and various Dutch overseas territories and colonial possessions (Kramsch, 2002). Both cases suggest, at the very least, that the 'fuzzy borders' of the EU are not as unprecedented as scholars sometimes imply. More generally they point to the need to complicate narratives of postmodernization with a greater appreciation of the colonial past and, to use Kramsch's phrase, 'post-colonial present'.

A second problem with the modern/postmodern narrative about Europe's borders stems from the wider vogue for post-ist labels. As much as these may be useful heuristic devices to plot complex transformations, they tend to inscribe a lack or fragmentation in the heart of the present, characterizing the present largely as an era that comes after a more coherent past. For this reason it could be argued that alongside these post-ism narratives there is a need for other concepts and inquiries that offer what Dean (1999: 179) calls a 'positive account of the present'. Positive is meant here not in a normative sense, but rather in terms of a need to express what is emergent, novel, contingent and irreducible – the domain Foucault has given the name of 'events' (Foucault, 1991).

Fortunately, such a move can be discerned in certain recent studies of Europe's borders. If the tendency in the 1990s was to map changing political space in terms of logics of postmodernization and deterritorialization, current research reveals a greater concern to interrogate the actual constitution of new spaces and their implications for borders and bordering. For instance, Bialasiewicz et al., (2005) offer a close reading of the recent Draft Constitution, revealing its implications for a process they call the 'constitution of EU territory'. They detect a 'profound ambiguity' with respect to the future of borders. This is because the Constitution harbours an aspiration to advance a European space of shared values and solidarity, expressed through principles of territorial cohesion. At the same time it also reinscribes a 'hard' sense of territory, to be organized through new external border controls as well as a concern with the territorial integrity and sovereign rights of the member states. Other studies have also noted a similar oscillation between 'soft' and 'hard' borders (DeBardeleben, 2005).
In a similar vein, recent scholarship reveals a growing level of interest in the emergence of new legal, political and administrative concepts, such as that of 'neighbourhood' (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 126–31) or the 'area of freedom, security and justice' (N. Walker, 2004), as well less official identities like 'Schengenland' (Kostakopoulou, 1998; Walters and Haahr, 2005). While I will touch on some of these in the following section, here it is worth noting that a better understanding of Europe's borders will surely require a closer reading of these novel spatialities and configurations, a reading that will doubtless be advanced by comparing them to emergent spaces in other regions. For instance, the literature on borders will surely be enriched by a more sustained comparison of Europe's 'area' with the American system of 'homeland security'.

**From Sovereignty to Sovereign Power**

If it is now widely observed that territoriality is being transformed, and that borders are becoming more fuzzy, dispersed and ambiguous, then this observation is often paralleled with an argument about the changing nature of sovereignty. One version holds that there is a crisis of state sovereignty, that the exclusive authority of the state to contain and manage movements across its frontier has been irreversibly undone by processes of globalization. Another version emphasizes the political response to globalization. Focusing on the EU, it suggests there has been a reorganization of sovereignty, with political and legal authority being relocated in several directions, including upwards where it is being 'pooled' in supranational authorities. Such accounts capture certain dynamics operating within European integration, not least its intergovernmental dimension. However, they are limited by a somewhat rationalistic and ahistorical conception of sovereignty. Sovereignty is regarded rather like a quantity which can be divided and recombined, or a tradable commodity. But what if sovereignty is subject to qualitative changes? Can we speak of different forms of sovereign power?

If it is possible to discern a move to rethink the nature of sovereign power, especially within international relations, then surely it has been the theme of empire and imperialism where this move has borne most fruit. In examining transformations of sovereignty in the security field in the period 'after' the Cold War, Waever (1997) offers a good example of research that connects themes of empire to the EU and the governance of Europe (but see also Böröcz and Kovács, 2001). Emphasizing that the empires he portrays are 'metaphorical' and not formalized or legal arrangements, Waever suggests that the Europe founded on the 'sovereign equality' of states is giving way to a political space of overlapping authorities. 'The empires metaphor points to a centredness which is not that of the sovereign state; not sovereign equality, but diffuse patterns of centres with power fading off' (Waever, 1997: 61).

While Waever revives a somewhat traditional, territorial understanding of empire, Hardt and Negri (2000) outline a quite novel conception. For Hardt and Negri we are faced not with a revival of imperialism but a new kind of global order they call 'Empire'. Empire is a new form of sovereignty – 'imperial' rather than 'imperialist'. It is not about dividing up and parcelling out territory but the constitution of a single global system based on globalized economic and cultural exchanges. 'Empire is the political subject that effectively regulates these global exchanges, the sovereign power that regulates the world' (2000: xi). 'In contrast to imperialism, Empire establishes no territorial centre of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentred and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers' (2000: xii).
Hardt and Negri's emphasis on a new form of sovereignty offers a critical perspective on those arts of governing associated with the fashionable term 'global governance', not to mention the forms of violence perpetrated by political subjects who act in the name of the international community and under the auspices of humanitarian principles. It is a useful way to interpret the modulating networks which weave together national and international, governmental and nongovernmental agencies, since it introduces the question of power into the relationships between these formations and a range of problems associated with 'globalization'. Seen from this perspective, the EU – and arguably the US itself – are not to be equated with empire. Instead, they are but two of the most prominent political agents and institutional sites whose activities are increasingly justified and rationalized by their relationship to this relatively decentred form of authority and the norms and normalization projects it mobilizes.

However, the relationship of this new form of imperial sovereignty to borders is possibly more complicated than Hardt and Negri allow. Under empire, we could hypothesize, borders do not melt into the space of deterritorialized networks and flows. Instead, like trade, literacy, corruption – or any of the other issues that one typically encounters itemized in the international comparisons and periodic country surveys of bodies like the UN, OECD and EU – borders become objects of this imperial authority as well.

Like many other areas of national policymaking, borders are subject to increasingly dense forms of 'reflexive government' (Dean, 1999) by a complex of public and private agencies located both inside and outside the state system. This does not mean that borders cease to 'belong' to particular nations, regions or continents. They retain such historical, political and cultural connections and memories. But it does mean that we can identify a series of new knowledges and practices which now articulate and redeploy the border within the kind of imperial system which Hardt and Negri describe. Consider, for example, how there now exists a series of international agencies both formally within the EU (e.g. FRONTEX) and beyond it (e.g. International Centre for Migration Policy Development) which bring specialist technical knowledge and assistance to bear in the governance of borders, and give practical effect to the new concepts which circulate within their milieu, concepts like 'risk analysis', 'border management' and 'border security'.

There is also the fact of the kind of outlook which this system of authority fosters. Within these agencies the aim is often to encourage an attitude of 'joint responsibility' on the part of neighbouring states (Walters, 2004b: 682). Where once the enemy was stationed on the other side of the border, this new logic of border control identifies a 'transversal' domain of non-state threats as the main locus of intervention (Bigo, 2000, 2002). The system of borders is rethought as an apparatus configured primarily in terms of the policing of 'mobile risks' – a term which, far from being neutral, actively creates a political equivalence between such otherwise heterogeneous identities as refugees, car thieves and illegal weapons-dealers. Meanwhile, there is a particular image of good practice, of effective borders, circulated by this apparatus. It holds that the task of border control is not to enclose nations, or contain societies. Instead, it is to balance 'liberties' with 'security'; to harness all the benefits of economic and cultural 'globalization' while safeguarding civic life from the threatening mobilities that have also been unleashed by globalization and which, like computer worms and viruses, threaten the integrity of network societies. For this reason, the border as imagined from the perspective of imperial authority is more like a filter (den Boer, 1995) or a firewall (Walters 2004a, 2006) than a fence.
Examining the internationalization, supranationalization and governmentalization of Europe's border control from the perspective of imperial sovereignty will surely offer new insights about the nature and topography of borders today. Yet this research may well find it necessary to combine old and new conceptions of empire and imperialism. As Waever notes, there are power gradients and intensities at work here. One does not see a process which transforms all borders equally and in the same way. This transnational expertise about borders does not descend from the sky. Instead, it moves in certain directions, often retracing former patterns of imperial power. Put simply, EU policing and immigration experts likely advise Moroccan state officials of their 'responsibilities' in the management of Europe's borders, not vice versa.

**Political Imagination**

Closely linked to the theme of modern territoriality, as well as the transformation of sovereignty, and increasingly central to recent studies of the changing place of borders in political space, is the theme of political imagination. Van Houtum and Strüver (2002: 141–2) note that, in geography at least, borders are no longer approached as self-evident lines on a map, but 'in terms of socially (re)produced phenomena' which 'differ crucially in their meaning, forms and contents of representations and interpretation from context to context'. Hence the need to grapple with the different imaginations of borders. Similarly, Balibar (2004), following Carlo Galli, argues that a conception of political space cannot analyse only the constitution of power and its control over space(s) but needs to grapple with the 'spatial representations' underlying any concept of power. Neocleous has followed Buck-Morss in adopting an explicitly topographical account of political imagination. This is one that takes seriously the kinds of shapes, icons and figures which populate a given political imagination, giving it a character that is closer to political landscape (Buck-Morss, 2000: 12; Neocleous, 2003: 1–2).

For Neocleous, this understanding of political imagination allows him to query the naturalization of power relations. For instance, he shows how modern practices of territory and borders find a principle of legitimacy in the idea that states are persons inhabiting – and owning – 'homes'. When we recall that the Latin word *domus* can refer both to the idea of home but is also related to the practice of subduing and taming the wild, then perhaps it is appropriate to describe as 'domopolitics' those practices which mobilize specifically domestic forms of reason as a way of legitimating authority and rule over territory (Walters, 2004a). One lesson we might draw from the governance of the EU as an 'area of freedom, security and justice' is that domopolitics can operate on multiple scales and spatialities, not just those of the state.

Balibar (2004) offers a particularly insightful discussion of some of the key representations, imaginings and mental patterns that currently underpin discourses about Europe's borders. He discerns four conflicting and largely incompatible patterns of political space, with different implications for the politics of citizenship, security, and mobility. These are the clash-of-civilizations, centre-periphery, global network and borderlands patterns.

The first two patterns underpin a great deal of scholarship on the subject of the 'enlargement' of the European Union and its implications for the meaning and location of its external frontiers. For instance, there are echoes of the civilizational discourse at work in the politics which surrounded the application of Central European states for EU membership. As
Kumar (2001: 81) has noted, the case for admission was quite often made by politicians and intellectuals in terms which stressed their nation's possession of quintessential and authentic 'European values'. In the scramble for EU membership Hungary was professed to be more authentically European than neighbouring Romania, and so on. Consequently, as these states jostled to 'rejoin' the European fold, the old borders of Europe took on new relevance as cultural and even civilizational markers.

However, it is Balibar's ideas of global network and borderlands that I want to expand upon here and link to other work on the theme of political imagination. To differing extents, both centre/periphery and civilizational discourses retain a close correspondence with geographical conceptions of space. This is less the case with the global network, invoking as it does the now familiar theme of fluid socioeconomic processes and flows that threaten to escape from territorial control. With the global network there is a 'primacy of circulation processes' over all processes and structures that are fixed and local. The network does not defy geography per se. It is often still imagined in geographical terms (for instance, in the aftermondialization imagery of world forums and mobilizations (Seattle, Porto Alegre, etc.). But these territorializations appear as only a 'mere transitory aspect of a more basic process of 'de-territorialization'. Early readings of the global network saw in it the advent of a new borderless world. Balibar has countered that this discourse does not deprive borders of all meaning but it certainly does 'relativize' them, making them 'transitional' objects and spaces of 'permanent transgression'.

These reflections on the function of borders under globalizing conditions can be deepened if we read them alongside the work of geographers, cultural theorists and anthropologists who are focusing on the material organization and culture of places like the airport, which today function as the nodes and gates of a global mobility system (Cunningham, 2004; Heyman, 2004; Miles, 1999). For instance, Cuttitta argues that we are faced with new borders that are no longer lines marked on the ground but 'elements (even immaterial ones) that permit, hinder or prevent the access to the network flows'. Adapting a term from Ratzel, he notes that in contrast to the 'closed territoriality' of states there now exists the 'new open territoriality of the global Grenzraum' (Cuttitta, 2006: 38). The more that border functions aggregate around the major airports and railway stations, moving the border into the inside of the territory (Knippenberg and Markusse, 1999: 11), the more that Europe's major cities rediscover the function they once had as gateways (Virilio, 1987).

Contiguous territories and networks have sometimes been juxtaposed as alternative ways of organizing social relations, politics and much else (Jönsson et al., 2000). However, when we broaden our discussion of networks to include information networks and networked databases, and the non-territorial realm of cyberspace, then the point is brought home that networks are not always processes which transgress borders and undermine the certainties of territory (Bonditti, 2004). On the contrary networks can become spaces of bordering practices in their own right. The EU has certainly championed a benign and largely positive view of networks as symbols and practices of integration, speed and cross-border mobility capable of resculpting European space (Barry, 2001). At the same time it also looks with greater urgency to networks of policing data and surveillance – for example, SIS I and II, Eurodac and now VIS – to underpin its aspirations to be an area of freedom, security and justice. Far from signalling the demise of territory and the limit of borders, it could be argued that such information networks are now deemed vital.
instruments in securing territory and (certain definitions of) population under conditions where
this can no longer be achieved by inspecting people at borders (Bigo, 2000; Huysmans, 2006).

The final image of borders and political space which Balibar discerns is that of
borderlands. Connoting a somewhat blurred zone of interchange rather than a rigid line of
division, a space of cultural mixing and ambiguous affiliation as much as fixed identity, and
subverting the negative value conventionally accorded to the peripheral, the idea of the
borderland has proven attractive to certain postmodern theorists of citizenship and space. The
borderland has more recently found an audience within EU studies where scholars and
policymakers, grappling with the paradoxes and contradictions raised by the drawing of new
borders, have found the borderland a rather attractive image and one that is deemed preferable to
the hard edge (Batt, 2003).

In a somewhat different vein, Delanty and Rumford (2005) have utilized borderlands as a
spatial metaphor for thinking Europe's troubled relationship to global processes. 'If borderlands
are seen as spaces within which the EU attempts to accommodate global processes then Europe
can be conceived as a continuous borderland perpetually engaged in an attempt to fix its
territorial and spatial arrangements into coherent patterns while global processes continually
disrupt older geographical certainties' (2005: 133).

Balibar seems to share this creative reading of the borderland as not merely a blurring of
geographical borders but a concept capable of applying much more widely to the contemporary
condition of the EU. But he goes further in exploring its potential as a motif with democratic
possibilities. Following Balibar, to describe Europe as a space of borderlands is to insist on its
multiple spatiality and its irreducibly plural social constitution. It is to understand Europe as an
open space of intersection and overlapping borderlands. For instance, there is a Euro-Atlantic
space, but also a Euro-Mediterranean space. Each borderland exceeds Europe, revealing how the
world is folded into Europe and vice versa. Since each can provide the basis for a claim to be the
authentic heartland, then the foundational character of such centres and peripheries is made
relative, and Europe is decentred. Balibar's minor theory of borderlands indicates how we might
move from a real geography to a genuinely political geography of Europe's borders.

If I have dwelt somewhat on Balibar's four political images here, it is not just because
they ably demonstrate research that tackles the imaginary dimension of borders and political
space. Nor is it because they offer a comprehensive typology of current ways of imagining the
meaning of borders. No doubt there are many other political imaginaries that merit further
analysis. (Not the least of these is the recurring yet impossible political dream of the border as a
wall, an impermeable militarized space of fences, watchtowers and geostrategy. Controversial
wall-borders currently defend Spain's enclaves in Morocco, just as they partition large swathes of
the borderlands of Israel/Palestine or US/Mexico.) Balibar's intervention is significant in another
way: by placing these different imaginations alongside one another he relativizes and de-
ontologizes each of them. It is not uncommon that otherwise sophisticated studies become so
immersed in their subject matter that their concepts are substantialized and given an ontological
depth. For example, rather than seeing networks as one of many ways in which actors have
categorized the world for purposes of understanding and acting on it, networks are often
interpreted to be the fundamental material and logic of our world, prompting Thompson's (2004)
sceptical remark: 'Is all the world a complex network?' Balibar reminds us that debates about
borders always contain a performative element. It is always a question of naming the world as
this and not that. As such, greater reflexivity about the terms and the function of these debates is merited, and an awareness that borders can be otherwise (Maier, 2002).

**Mobilities, Migrations, Borders**

To this point we have surveyed some of the main trends in the study of Europe's borders, arguing that it is instructive to cluster these around the themes of territoriality, sovereignty and political imagination. Migration provides a prism with which to view some of the above transformations in borders and bordering but in greater empirical and contextual detail. But if research into migration offers certain insights about the meaning and form of Europe's borders today, it does so not merely as one case study among many. For migration has become in many ways one of the most central, controversial and politically charged issues confronting discourse and policy about borders. Despite the fact that immigration policy is a multifaceted domain and in no way reducible to the control of borders, it often seems that discussions about migration are almost axiomatically dialogues about borders and vice versa.

Yet as tight as it sometimes appears, it is important to note that this migrations–borders nexus is not self-evident and certainly not timeless. Historically sensitive studies are beginning to reveal that there has been 'significant historical variation in border control priorities' (Andreas, 2003: 78). As Andreas suggests, while the military function of borders has declined, and while economic liberalization and globalization may have lessened the role of the border as a site of customs inspection and foreign exchange control, the function of policing the movement of population has become central to the concept of the border. Historical studies reveal that this latter function is in fact quite recent. In many Western states it was only in the early decades of the twentieth century that immigration control was made a fully national rather than a local or provincial matter, and only at this time that administrative control over the national borders came to be seen as a means to this end (Hammar, 1986; Sassen, 1999). As one study of the English poor law suggests (Feldman, 2003), in the nineteenth century and before, and inasmuch as the movement of people was articulated as a political problem, it was in relation to a space of parish and county borders as much as national frontiers.

While historical perspectives have done much to advance our understanding of the borders–migration nexus, other studies have concentrated upon its contemporary aspects.

I shall briefly survey three of these – research on the political dynamics of bordering, the political economy of borders and capitalism, and finally, analyses of bordering in terms of specific locales and technologies through which it is enacted.

**The Political Dynamics of Bordering**

One of the most important developments within the interdisciplinary field of border studies is undoubtedly the shift from the study of borders as institutions or lines to border-ing, with the latter understood as a verb as much as a noun. Van Houtum characterizes this as a move that pays more attention to the 'human practices that constitute and represent socio-spatial differences in space' (van Houtum, 2005: 672). This shift to examine Europe's borders from the perspective of bordering processes is especially evident in the field of migration politics and policy.
We have seen how political theorists and political geographers have sought to map the changing topography of Europe's borders. But a great deal of research, especially in the area of political science and policy studies, has emphasized the need to understand the political and institutional dynamics underpinning new patterns of bordering. A good example of such research comes from those who have developed Zolberg's insights about 'remote control' immigration policy (Guiraudon, 2003; Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000; Samers, 2004; Zolberg, 1999). Remote control refers to a set of practices and tendencies that are changing what might be called the political geography of migration control, extending border controls away from the wealthiest 'countries of destination' and closer to what official discourse designates as 'countries of transit' and 'origin'. Often precautionary and preventative in their logic, these practices include the widespread use of visa programmes to code risky nationalities and filter out unwanted travellers; carrier liability procedures which seek to enrol airlines and shipping companies into networks of migration control; and policy proposals, as yet unimplemented, to conduct the processing of EU-bound asylum applicants 'offshore', for example in Libya, well before they can reach the 'territory' of Europe. Inasmuch as the EU's accession process has seen hopeful new member states 'importing' Schengen norms and practices of border control so as to demonstrate their fitness for participation in the EU's extended space of free movement and control (Lavenex and Uçarer, 2003), it might also be considered a particular instance of remote control.

One of the strengths of these studies is to suggest ways in which political processes play themselves out in spatializing strategies. Studies of remote control emphasize that border spaces take shape in the midst of policy-making dilemmas. The impulse to relocate controls away from the border needs to be seen as an attempt to mediate between contradictory political objectives. On the one hand political authorities are confronted with public cultures of disquiet about 'immigration'; a media-driven 'governmentality of unease' (Bigo, 2002) that equates 'immigration' with disorder, and enhanced border control with security. But political authorities are also faced with other pressures and concerns. For one thing there is the imperative to maintain open borders for the purposes of trade and tourism. But another is the existence of domestic and international human rights laws that accord migrants and refugees basic protections. In the view of many scholars, these laws and the wider public and legal cultures that support them, constrain governments in their approach to migration. Here, then, we find a powerful motivation to relocate border control away from the border: if the borders of the EU and its close neighbours now demarcate a space of humanitarian protection, new forms of border control aim to regulate the political liabilities associated with the observance of such principles.

Because of the way that border control is being redistributed across political and virtual space, and is implicating the states of 'sending' and 'transit' countries in the control strategies of European states, a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of remote control will surely require studies of the borders–migration nexus to strengthen their ties with research in geopolitics. Several writers have fruitfully taken up the theme of a geopolitics of migration control (Geddes, 2005; Samers, 2004). Furthering the critical thrust of such work will perhaps involve closer attention to the discursive dimension of this geopolitics. For instance, what politics is at stake in
the construction of a regime as a 'transit country'? But it will also be important to recognize that there is now a critical geopolitics that comes 'from below', finding expression in the political and cultural interventions of artists, planners, activists and migrants themselves. For instance, the collective AnArchitektur (2003) has produced what it calls a Grenzgeografie of the now defunct refugee camp at Sangatte, near the French entrance to the Eurotunnel. For several years Sangatte had been a significant transit point for unauthorized migration to the UK. Mapping the shifting pathways which migrants created in their confrontation with the fortification of the entrance to the Eurotunnel, AnArchitektur graphically demonstrate how the geopolitics of borders is a deeply contested and dynamic affair.

The Political Economy of Borders

A somewhat different perspective on processes of rebordering in the context of migration comes from scholars working in the tradition of critical political economy. As we have seen, policymaking approaches recognize that economic imperatives impinge powerfully on border policies. However, for those concerned with what we might call the political economy of borders, the socioeconomic dimension is not just one factor amongst several, but pre-eminent. A key observation for such work concerns the constitutive power of bordering projects and the role they play in structuring labour markets, experiences of citizenship and non-citizenship, and social and/or national identity. Certainly this approach highlights how there has been an intensification of border and migration controls across Europe over the past 20 years or so, and how these patterns of securitization and militarization of borders constitute a political response to a number of developments (Huysmans, 2006). Not the least of these are processes associated with globalization, a 'crisis' of mass asylum-seeking, and the fact that the crumbling of the Iron Curtain meant that Western European states could no longer count on state communism to police the movement of people on its eastern flank. But while some rightly stress the way in which these controls make Europe's outer borders a new 'frontier of poverty' (Freudenstein, 2000), and its land borders a new space of suffering and death (Fekete, 2004), others point out that whatever the intensity of these control projects, they do not actually prevent the movement of migrants into Europe, so much as shape the terms under which their movements and subsequent existence takes place (Favell and Hansen, 2002; Mezzadra and Neilson, 2003).

Two points can be made about borders when seen from a critical political economy viewpoint. First, there is a continuity, at least at the level of effects, between the contemporary regime of intensive border and migration controls, and currents of neoliberalization at work within European and global capitalism. While the assertion of political sovereignty and control might appear as antithetical to antistatist, neoliberal logics, it can still be observed that inasmuch as border regimes play an active, constitutive role in criminalizing migrant labour, inasmuch as they give rise to semi-permanent, vulnerable sectors of workers, then Europe's border regime should be seen as a major element in the flexibilization of work (Samers, 2003). This point is underscored by studies of recent changes in labour and immigration law in southern European countries like Italy and Spain. These changes serve to maintain many migrant workers in a state of quasi-permanent deportability (Calavita and Suarez-Navaz, 2003).

The observation that migrant labour is utilized by states and employers as a reserve army is, of course, not new (Castles and Kosack, 1973) cited in Calavita (2003: 400). While its
champions highlight its positive relationship to human freedom, critics of capitalism insist that the utilization and reproduction of unfree labour – whether in the form of plantation slavery, transported convicts or today's sans papiers – is a recurring and not incidental feature within the history of capitalism (Harvey, 2004; Moulier Boutang, 1998). What changes are the forms in which such unfreedoms are organized and distributed, but at the same time the possibilities which inhere within different practices and regimes of unfreedom – however narrow and circumscribed – for struggles for citizenship.

Second, and following on, there is a point to be made about the border as a site of social struggle. Drawing on studies which stress the autonomous power of struggles from below (Rodriguez, 1996), Mezzadra cautions against the view that sees migrants only as the victims of faceless processes or of organized criminality (Mezzadra, 2004; Mezzadra and Neilson, 2003; see also Koslowski, 2000: 204–5). Without denying that social and economic processes play a profound role in shaping patterns of migration, he insists that the rebordering of Europe be seen as a dynamic, antagonistic process in which the strategic agency of migrants, albeit exercised with varying levels of consciousness and intent, is actually shaping the borders of Europe. In many ways, he suggests, rebordering is not just an assertion of state (or suprastate) sovereignty, but a response to the transgressive practices and rhizomatic pathways, the new social spaces which migrants are fabricating from below. It has often been observed that borders are time frozen in space (O'Dowd and Wilson, 1996: 1–2), expressions of a particular equilibrium of military and diplomatic power between states. At a moment when Europe's borders seem more concerned with the movement of people than politico-military struggles over territory perhaps we can say that it the changing topography and intensity of social struggles which they now inscribe.

**Border Sites and Technologies**

If studies of remote control migration policy analyse bordering in terms of the logic of states and policy makers, and political economy approaches examine the relationship between forms of capitalism and border regimes, a third set of inquiries should be mentioned. This, in contrast, grapples with the practical ways in which bordering is effected. More case-focused in their approach, these projects examine how bordering is enacted at particular sites in terms of particular techniques, strategies and programmes. Utilizing insights and methods drawn from critical anthropology, ethnography and Foucauldian political sociology, such work treats borders as irreducible sites whose functions cannot be read off larger systems but instead require careful analysis of dynamic and contradictory situations. Border control is seen in terms of ‘specific routines, technological devices and knowledge that shape a European space of free movement by externalizing and stratifying dangerous, excessive use of freedom’ (Huysmans, 2006: 97). Of particular note is the way these studies engage with the question of mobility. Mobility is frequently discussed in unproblematic terms, as a synonym for migration, or symptom of the macroprocesses of globalization.

However, underpinning research into border sites and technologies is an understanding of mobility as a social and cultural value, a political problem, and a sociotechnical accomplishment whose emergence, as such, cannot be assumed but must be explained. As with Lefebvre's notion of space, mobility is seen not as something secondary but always produced under particular historical and cultural circumstances (Cresswell, 2001). Hence it can be asked: what role do borders play in the production, distribution and institutionalization of a range of mobilities and immobilities? What are the technical and practical ways in which bordering is effected?
One site where the intersection of technologies, subjectivities, migrations and markets occurs, giving rise to particular practices of mobility and immobility, is the port. We have already discussed ports in relation to the theme of networks and non-contiguous borders. But they are also relevant to the question of mobilities. Verstraete provides a vivid account of the involvement of private companies in marketing human detection technologies to the Belgian port of Zeebrugge. From the perspective of shipping companies who may be fined for failing to interdict clandestine travellers, refugees are not a human rights issue so much as a cost to production and efficiency. This has given rise to an 'emerging market in the removal of illegal refugees' (Verstraete, 2001: 27). If the rise of human trafficking and smuggling has transformed unauthorized border-crossing into the site of a growing clandestine economy in its own right (Koslowski, 2000), then it would seem that the task of countering these movements is also becoming marketized. Moreover, if Europe's borders can be seen as the site of social struggles, then such struggles are producing new economic spaces as well. Further work in this area would add a new dimension to the theme of remote control. For instance, it might consider some of the ways in which private companies are not simply carrying out tasks offloaded by the state, but becoming inventive and strategic sites of border control in their own right. Put differently, and to connect to an earlier theme in this chapter, if we want to analyse more fully the production of new forms of territoriality, we should not limit our focus to states and their policies but include emerging markets in risk management, security and control.

Other work has focused on airports as spaces of mobile governance (Fuller, 2003; Miles, 1999). Drawing on the literature of surveillance studies, Adey (2004) has applied the idea of 'sorting' to the airport. Given that the redesign and policing of airports has for some time been encoded as an operational norm within the Schengen acquis, it is important to note the ways in which airports and other transportation hubs contribute to a stratification of European space. Forming an assemblage with a series of heterogeneous elements that includes passports, European law, security practices, and the economy of cut-price air travel, one sees how airports are helping to create smooth, cross-border, pan-European spaces of business, leisure and tourism. At the same time, these same systems promise to arrest the flow of those subjects who lack the requisite identity or nationality, fit the risk profile, or simply arouse the suspicion of the authorities. For these categories cross-border movement has become ever more difficult. The study of airports as borders offers insights regarding the sifting of population movements, its distribution across different levels, and spaces and scales of mobility.

Sorting techniques stratify European territory, both producing and regulating social access to smooth and striated spaces. But they do not necessarily signal the end of the old borders of Europe. This, at least, is one conclusion to be drawn from van der Ploeg's (1999) careful study of Eurodac. This is an EU initiative to use biometric fingerprint data to control 'illegal immigration' and border crossing by asylum seekers. The political dream of Eurodac is to couple a kind of branding of the mobile subject – a branding which makes the body of the subject bear witness about their status, implicating that body in the 'distribution of benefits, services, rights' (van der Ploeg, 1999: 296) – with an authoritative determination of whether the subject has sought asylum or previously entered territory elsewhere in the EU. Hence Eurodac reveals another paradox of Europe's borders. At the same time that it responds to issues raised by the construction of extended spaces of free movement – and helps to constitute and secure those spaces – it also serves to recognize the old borders of the European state system. In determining, for instance, whether a refugee first entered
the EU in France or Italy, Eurodac ensures that the outlines of the national system of borders remain administratively pertinent and politically salient. The case of Eurodac illustrates that we are dealing with new spatial assemblages in which extended trans-European spaces do not displace the old pattern of borders but interconnect with them, in some cases reviving them, in new and unexpected ways.

Eurodac is also interesting from the point of view of changing forms of sovereignty. Foucault introduced his famous study *Discipline and Punish* with a harrowing description of the torture and execution of Damien, a subject convicted of regicide. His point was in part to explore how the sovereign power of the monarchy was performed at the level of the body through gruesome and spectacular practices of life-taking. Could it be that the new kinds of networked sovereignty which Hardt and Negri have theorized are also evident at the level of mobile bodies. In the case of Eurodac, there is a biometrical marking of itinerant bodies not as an expression of a centralized sovereign, but, on the contrary, as a way of governing European space in the absence of a single sovereign centre. It seems that Eurodac has been invented to govern a situation in which political responsibility for governing asylum remains fragmented, decentralized and politically controversial.

**Conclusion**

Charles Maier has suggested that in a very broad sense North America and Europe have been associated with two different kinds of border. A dominant figure within North American thinking is, of course, the frontier. This was a transitional space that appeared within the colonial imagination as dividing 'civilization from nature or from peoples thought to be at a "lower" or less advanced degree of social development' (Maier, 2002: 17). Whereas the North American frontier marks the end, or moving edge of (white) settlement, the idea of a frontier for Europeans is more like a line dividing settlements and populations. The former finds its symbolism in the forest or the prairie, the latter in the border post.

It is tempting to conclude that one of the most interesting features of Europe's borders today is the fact that both these figures appear to be present. On the one hand Europe continues to generate new states and with them, borders that demarcate peoples and territories. Moreover, the politics and programmes of regionalization means that these patterns of state borders are overlaid by a complex space of regional borders which, in certain cases, may anticipate future state borders. Inasmuch as the institutions of the European Union lend support to the viability of new states as well as patterns of region-building, then processes of European integration ensure that Maier's typical European border is far from dead. On the other hand, the practices and programmes known as EU enlargement seem to introduce elements of the North American frontier into European political space. Of course, one should not push the analogy too far. The EU’s external frontier is partial and incomplete: a frontier only for some purposes, such as migration control (M. Anderson and Bigo, 2003: 23). Moreover, notwithstanding the attempts of certain commentators to construe it as a civilizational edge, it lacks the explicitly racialized definition associated with the North American frontier. But there are continuities as well: in both cases the frontier operates as a zone where an organized power meets its outside in a relationship of transformation and assimilation. In both cases, one sees the
spatialization of asymmetrical relationships in which an expanding power assumes the right to define what is appropriate and just, albeit that this game now plays itself out in the seemingly technical and benign norms and language of political and economic 'governance'.

Yet such a conclusion concerning the co-presence of these two border types in Europe would need to be qualified on at least two counts. First, this is not the first time that these types have been combined. According to Maier, the 'Romans left us an idea of the frontier that shared both elements – the end of their world, but one that had to be fortified against outsiders at a clear border' (Maier, 2002: 18). Second, and this is the more significant point, the frontier and the borderline certainly do not exhaust the possible forms and topographies of borders in Europe today. As we have seen, it is also possible to speak of a third kind of border – a nodal or networked border that is neither a division of population and territory, nor an edge of civilizational order, but a filter or mesh. Most borders allow a certain degree of movement and transgression. But for this nodal border the governance and security of extended spaces of mobility becomes one of, if not the principal function(s). Future research could fruitfully examine how the reorganization of political space in Europe – a reconstruction that is associated with the institutional programme of EU enlargement – combines these three types of borders in complex, contradictory and unpredictable ways.

Future research may well uncover other types of border as well. For instance, ethnographic research on the experience of 'trafficked' women is revealing a kind of border-crossing that takes the form of highly dangerous and in some ways epic journeys across rivers and forests (Andrijasevic, 2004). Because they cannot always utilize conventional forms of transit across Europe, the journeys of these subjects are rediscovering a very old kind of border – the 'natural frontier' of the mountain, the coast and the river. The fact that 'natural' frontiers should once again become relevant to the meaning and experience of borders in Europe suggests that the rebordering of Europe be understood as a complex and relatively open-ended process without a telos.

References


